FM 30-16, Technical Intelligence, August 1966 by Bolin, Robert, , depositor
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DOD Military Intelligence U.S. Department of Defense
8-1966
FM 30-16, Technical Intelligence, August 1966
Robert Bolin , depositor
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, rbolin2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dodmilintel
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons,
Other Engineering Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet
Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Defense at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in DOD Military Intelligence by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Bolin, Robert , depositor, "FM 30-16, Technical Intelligence, August 1966" (1966). DOD Military Intelligence. 71.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dodmilintel/71
I 
FM 30-16 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 
TECHNICAL 
IN.TEllIGENCE 
HEADQUARTERS , DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
AUGUST 1966 
TAGO 6690A 
·FM 30-16 
FIELD MANUAL} 
No. 30-16 
HEADQUARTERS 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
WASHINGTON, D.C., 19 September 1966 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Paragraph Page 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Section I. General ____________________________________________ _ 1,2 
3-7 
3 
4 II. Missions and objectives ______________________________ _ 
CHAPTER 2. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY 
Section I. Mission and capabilities _______________________________ 8-10 6 
II. Functions and organization __________________________ 11, 12 9 
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
FUNCTIONALIZA TION 
Section I. General ____________________________________________ _ 
II. Communication-Electronics intelligence _______________ _ 
III. Weapons and munitions intelligence __________________ _ 
IV. General supply and equipment intelligence _____________ _ 
V. Mobility intelligence _________________________________ _ 
VI. Medical intelligence _________________________________ _ 
VII. Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) technical 
intelligence _______________________________________ _ 
CHAPTER 4. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND 
COLLECTION 
Section I. Planning ___________________________________________ _ 
II. Collection __________________________________________ _ 
III. Collection agencies and liaison _______________________ _ 
CHAPTER 5. CAPTURED MATERIEL EVACUATION 
Section I. General ____________________________________________ _ 
II. Recovery procedures ________________________________ _ 
III. Collection teams, examination, tagging, and evacuation __ 
CHAPTER 6. PROCESSING OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
Section I. Processing _________________________________________ _ 
II. Aspects of technical intelligence production ___________ _ 
III. Security considerations ______________________________ _ 
IV. Technical intelligence reports _______________________ _ 
V. Dissemination _____________________________________ _ 
CHAPTER 7. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 
Section I. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support ___________ _ 
II. Military police support ______________________________ _ 
III. Civil affairs support ________________________________ _ 
CHAPTER 8. INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS 
Section I. General ____________________________________________ _ 
II. Responsibilities _____________________________________ _ 
III. Procedures ________________________________________ _ 
CHAPTER 9. THE STRATEGIC EFFORT ________________________ _ 
13 12 
14,15 12 
16-18 14 
19-21 15 
22,23 16 
24-27 17 
28-31 18 
32-36 20 
37,38 21 
39,40 22 
41,42 24 
43,44 24 
45-48 26 
49-52 30 
53-56 31 
57,58 33 
59-61 34 
62,63 35 
64-69 36 
70-75 38 
76-78 39 
79,80 41 
81-83 42 
84-92 42 
93-96 47 
* This manual supersed.s FM 30-16, 12 June 1961. 
AGO 6680.& 1 
Page 
ApPENDIX I. REFERENCES. ________________________________________________ 50 
II. MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLI-GENCE ______________________________________________________ 52 
III. EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN ___________ 53 
IV. STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF 
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIP-MENT ______________________________________________________ 57 
V •. STANAG 2097-NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC 
ARMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ______________________ 72 
INDEX ________________________________________________________________ 75 
2 AGO &&IOA 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Section I. GENERAL 
1. Purpose and Scope 
a. This manual sets forth doctrine and estab-
li~hes procedures for the management, plan-
mng, collection, production, reporting, and 
dissemination of Army technical intelligence. 
The manual is applicable to both nuclear and 
nonnuclear warfare. It covers procedures and 
establishes broad principles regarding the role 
of military intelligence personnel and units in 
technical intelligence, and provides guidance 
for commanders, staffs, and combat support 
personnel in technical intelligence matters. 
b. Users of this manual are encouraged to 
submit recommended changes or comments to 
improve the manual. Comments should be 
keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line 
of text in which the change is recommended. 
Reasons should be provided for each comment 
to insure understanding and complete evalu-
ation. Whenever possible, comments should be 
prepared on DA Form 1598 and forwarded 
direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army 
Combat Developments Command Intelligence 
Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219. 
2. Definitions 
a. For definition of terms used see AR 320-5. 
b. The relationship of intelligence and tech-
nical intelligence is set forth below. 
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting 
from the collection, evaluation, analy-
sis, integration, and interpretation of 
all information concerning one or 
more aspects of foreign countries or 
areas which are immediately or poten-
tially significant to the development 
and execution of military plans, poli-
cies, and operations. Intelligence con-
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sists of evaluated information and 
conclusions which the tactical com-
mander, staff officers, and strategic 
planners require on a continual basis 
to determine enemy probable courses 
of action. Intelligence production is a 
completely integrated effort and no 
one phase of intelligence must ever be 
considered to be the sole intelligence 
system. Each aspect and level of mili-
tary intelligence, to include technical 
intelligence, plays a vital role in the 
final tactical, theater, and strategic 
intelligence picture and therefore 
must be considered as part of an over-
all integrated intelligence effort. All 
tactical commanders and staff officers 
employ intelligence in planning and 
maintaining the security of commands. 
(2) Technical intelligence is defined as 
intelligence concerning foreign tech-
nological developments, performance 
and operational capabilities of foreign 
materiel, which now or may eventually 
have a practical application for mili-
tary purposes. It is the end product 
resulting from the processing and col-
lation of technical information. How-
ever, the scope of technical intelligence 
is broad; and it includes all technical 
aspects of foreign equipment, sup-
plies, installations, facilities, commun-
ications, captured and abandoned 
items, conventional or special, which 
now have or may have a practical ap-
plication in furthering military oper-
ations. The scope also includes, 
particularly during internal defense 
3 
operations, captured friendly and al-
lied equipment and materiel which 
may have been used against US forces. 
Technical intelligence contributes pri-
marily to the extension of the combat 
intelligence effort. 
c. Other terms used in this manual are-
(1) Scientific and technical intelligence-
includes that foreign intelligence re-
hlting to basic and applied research in 
natural and applied sciences and engi-
neering; scientific and technical char. 
acteristics, capabilities, and limita-
tions of foreign weapons, weapon 
systems, and other materiel; produc-
tion methods employed in their manu-
facture, and related technology per-
taining to materiel supply. operation, 
and maintenance. 
(2) Factory marking-the numbers, let-
ters, symbols placed on manufactured 
products (or in accompanying docu-
ments) during manufacture or inspec-
tion for purposes of identification and 
,control. 
(3) Significant equipment-captured ene-
my equipment likely to produce more 
technical inteUigence of value than 
others. 
Section II. MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
3. General 
The United States must maintain a supel'ior 
position to all enemies and potential enemies in 
any given area of technology and be alert to the 
current and future technological developments 
of all nations. The contributions of U.S. science 
and technology have already provided a techno-
logical superiority and an extensive research 
and development effort has been created in 
order to maintain this superiority in the future. 
4. General Mission of TechnicallnteUigence 
Units 
a. The mission of Army technical intelligence 
units is to provide assistance to tactical com-
manders in the selective examination, evalu-
ation, and classification of technical informa-
tion derived from technical examination of 
foreign equipment and materiel. 
b. Technical intelligence units/personnel at 
all levels perform a twofold function-
(1) They assist the tactical commander 
and staff in meeting tactical planning 
needs in technical areas. 
(2) They assist the strategic scientific/ 
technical intelligence effort by sup-
porting theater, DA and DOD agencies 
in the overall integrated technical in-
telligence collection and analysis effort. 
5. Maior Obiedives 
The major objectives of technical intelligence 
are to--
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a.. Determine enemy technical materiel 
threats as they affect strategic and tactical 
planners and commanders. 
b. Determine foreign technological capabil-
ities and limitations. 
c. Provide information from which military 
countermeasures are developed. 
d. Permit use of foreign materiel and facil-
ities by US forees. 
e. Exploit new developments for US military 
needs. 
f. Fulfill national and/or military technical 
"items-wanted list." 
g. Provide input Gna continuous basis to the 
overall national integrated technical and scien-
tific intelligence program in consonance with 
theater policies. 
k. Provide tactical and strategic studies on 
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of 
foreign facilities, equipment, installations, ma-
teriel, and resources. 
6. General Concepts 
a. In order to fulfill the above missions, U.S. 
Army technical intelligence units are provided 
primarily to support the field army commander's 
tactical technical intelligence requirements. 
b. In fulfilling the above missions, military 
technical intelligence units provide on-the-spot 
field analysis, detailed analysis, and limited 
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operational data from field testing. De~iled 
analysis and evaluation is performed by the 
technical intelligence company of the field army 
and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed 
technical analysis beyond field army and/or 
theater resources is performed in the appropri-
ate CONUS-producing unit. 
c. Technical intelligence requires prompt ex-
ploitation at the tactical echelon to be of maxi-
mum benefit to tactical commanders. Therefore, 
technical intelligence elements at all echelons 
operate as functionally integrated teams to in-
sure maximum coordination, collation, and ex-
ploitation of foreign arms, equipment, and ma-
teriel. 
d. Prompt exploitation provides usable tac-
tical intelligence, assists in the production of 
strategic technical intelligence, facilitates mili-
tary training, and assists the overall national 
research and development effort. 
7. Expanded Mission 
a. At times, the U.S. Army technical intelli-
gence effort supports related scientific and tech-
nieal intelligence production of the Army Ma-
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teriel Command (AMC) and joint/national 
intelligence requirements of Department of De-
fense research agencies in consonance with 
theater approved technical intelligence pro-
grams. 
b. In unified or specified commands, the fac-
tors of distance and processing time from the 
zone of interior may make it desirable for the 
commander's intelligence organizations to per-
form certain functions normally associated with 
CONUS units. In such cases the unified or spe-
cified commander advises the higher echelon 
concerned of the functions being performed. 
He also insures that his action does not inter-
rupt the flow of information to the higher eche-
lon. Included among these functions may be-
(1) Publication of technical intelligence 
bulletins. 
(2) Publication of intelligence of a general 
orientation nature. 
(3) Preparation and dissemination of 
other intelligence studies and docu-
ments which would lose utility if de-
layed by preparation in the zone of 
interior. 
s 
CHAPTER 2 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY 
Section I. MISSION AND CAPABILITIES 
8. General 
The technical intelligence company provides 
for the selective examination, evaluation, and 
classification of technical information and the 
dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom, 
through the technical examination of enemy 
materiel. 
9. Mission 
a. The technical intelligence company is or-
ganized under TOE 30-34 (fig. 1) and provides 
for the functionaIized execution of the technical 
intelligence within the field army. This group-
ing, in one company, of various technical skills 
provides a capability for a coordinated techni-
cal intelligence effort; provides an interchange 
of skills, knowledge and experience, and a con-
solidation of specialized technical skills neces-
sary to provide a widely varied functional tech-
nical intelligence support to the field army. 
Normally, the unit is located in the Field Army 
Support Command (F ASCOM) area and oper-
ates under the direct control of the Military 
Intelligence Battalion TOE 30-25 (fig 2). This 
unit is completely airtransportable; however, 
it is only fifty percent ground mobile. 
b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, (ACofS, 
G2) Field Army. is responsible for the direction 
and staff supervision of the entire technical 
intelligence effort for the field army commander. 
Therefore, close coordination and liaison with 
the technical intelligence company and the G2 
staff (e.g., Order of Battle and Strategic Intelli-
gence) through the military intelligence battal-
ion are necessary to insure smooth integration 
of the overall technical intelligence effort. 
c. The technical intelligence company is 
capable of providing necessary technical intelli-
6 
gence support to corps and divisions assigned 
to the field army. In addition, it is a flexible 
organization readily adaptable to the integra-
tion of technical intelligence activities of other 
services and can be integrated into a joint or 
unified command intelligence effort in all types 
of warfare. 
d. The technical intelligence company is or-
ganic to the military intelligence battalion, field 
army. Cellular functional technical intelligence 
teams from TOE 30-600 can provide augmen-
tation to the unit as required. Aso, the unit is 
compatible with the support systems employed 
within a theater of operations and the commod-
ity-oriented CONUS base. 
10. Capabilities 
a. At full strength, the technical intelligence 
company has the capabilities to-
(l) Examine, evaluate, and classify cap-
tured enemy materiel. 
(2) Prepare and disseminate technical in-
telligence reports, summaries, and 
analyses. 
(3) Prepare and maintain technical intelli-
gence files and records. 
(4) Prepare and assist in the preparation 
of captured enemy materiel for evacu-
ation to CONUS bases as required. 
(5) Participate in the interrogation of 
prisoners of war and to process the in-
formation derived therefrom. 
(6) Operate as a control center for a co-
ordinated technical intelligence pro-
gram within the field army. 
b. The unit is dependent upon theater re-
sources for chemical and medical laboratory 
support. 
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Figure 2. TOE 30-25, Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
c. At reduced strength, the unit is adaptable 
to lesser capabilities during prolonged combat 
periods for a limited period of time. In add i-
tion, the unit is capable of supporting an inde-
pendent corps for a limited period of time. 
Section II. FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION 
11. Functions 
This company performs all technical intelli-
gence functions utilizing combat service sup-
port personnel operating as functional ele-
ments. For example, the company-
a. Assists in the technical intelligence plan-
ning being conducted concurrently by the mili-
tary intelligence battalion headquarters and the 
field army G2 staff. 
b. Coordinates directives for the collection of 
technical intelligence source materiel. This ma-
teriel normally will be evacuated through the 
tactical unit support channels to the technical 
intelligence company, field army. 
c. Provides centralized control of all tech-
nical intelligence activities in the field army 
area. (Engineer topographic, terrain intelli-
gence, and signal communications intelligence 
are not included within the scope of technical 
intelligence. ) 
d. Is organized to function as the command 
and control center for the receipt, evaluation, 
reporting, and shipment of all technical intelli-
gence materiel received in the field army. 
12. Unit Operations 
a. Company Headquarters. Personnel and 
equipment are provided in the company head-
quarters for the supervision, coordination, and 
control of the activities of organic platoons. 
Also, unit supply, mess, maintenance, com-
munication, and general administration are 
provided. 
b. Support Platoon. This platoon provides 
technical support to the evaluation and analysis 
sections of the company such as drafting; 
illustrating; packing, crating, and shipping ma-
terial; translating; and photographic services. 
This allows full utilization of critical skills 
within the various sections and improves sup-
port to all elements of the program. The func-
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tions of elements of the support platoon are as 
follows: 
(1) Platoon headq'LLarters. The headquar-
ters is responsible for supervising and 
directing the activities of the platoon 
and providing drafting and illustrat-
ing support to the unit. 
(2) Photography section. This section 
provides both still and motion picture 
photographic services for the com-
pany. Developing, printing, enlarging, 
and other processing support is re-
quired from the Army Signal Bat-
talion (TOE 11-95), although fre-
quently the military intelligence 
battalion can directly provide limited 
support. 
(3) Receiving and shipping section. This 
section receives and unpacks equip-
ment and materiel. It also packs and 
crates small items of materiel for 
evacuation as required. The section 
has within it the necessary expertise 
in the handling of explosive, chemical, 
biological, and radiological materiel. 
(4) Translating section. This section 
translates foreign language documents 
concerning foreign technical intelli-
gence materiel into English or other 
languages as required. It also trans-
lates identification plates, nomencla-
ture markings, and instructions ac-
companying foreign materiel. 
c. Evaluation and Analysis Platoon. 
(1) This platoon performs the detailed 
analysis of documents and materiel 
for information pertinent to technical 
intelligence. It evaluates this informa-
tion in conjunction with reports and 
information from other intelligence 
sources, and prepares reports for dis-
tribution as prescribed. 
(2) Each of the sections in this platoon 
has certain common functions and 
9 
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responsibilities. In the production of 
technical intelligence, each section, 
under the supervision of the platoon 
leader-
(a) Assists in planning the collection 
effort. 
(b) Provides guidance to the corps col-
lection teams in the collection of 
technical information and materiel. 
(c) Evaluates and processes the col-
lected materiel for technical intelli-
gence information. 
(d) Disseminates the resulting technical 
intelligence. 
(e) Assists in interrogation of prisoners 
of war, refugees, evacuees, dis-
placed persons, and escapees for 
information of interest to technical 
intelligence. 
(3) The functions of elements of the eval-
nation and analysis platoon are as 
follows: 
(a) Platoon headquarters. This head-
quarters is responsible for initial 
analysis of materiel, coordination of 
evaluation between the various sec-
tions of the platoon, and participa-
tion in the preparation, develop-
ment, and dissemination of reports 
through prescribed command and 
intelligence channels. The platoon 
headquarters provides the control, 
assignment for evaluation, and re-
cording of disposition of technical 
intelligence items. When an item of 
materiel is received, the platoon 
headquarters assigns the item to the 
section which has primary interest, 
and informs other sections having 
secondary interest. 
(b) Communications-electronics section. 
This section performs technical 
evaluation and analysis of fixed 
plant communications, signal equip-
ment, and signal information. It 
supervises storage, issue, and proc-
essing of collected foreign communi-
cations materiel. It analyzes elec-
tronic warfare, automatic data 
processing, combat surveillance, 
radar, radiac, and meteorological 
materiel. 
(c) Weapons and munitions section. 
This section performs the technical 
intelligence evaluation and analysis 
of free rockets, guided missiles, and 
associated equipment including in-
ternal guidance and launching 
equipment; weapons and combat 
vehicles to include tanks, towed and 
self-propelled guns, howitzers and 
armored personnel carriers; nuclear 
and nonnuclear ammunition; rocket 
and missile warhead sections (nu-
clear and nonnuclear) ; chemical, bi-
ological, and radiological weapons, 
munitions and ammunitions, and 
propellants; explosives and pyro-
technics; meteorological and propel-
lant-activated devices; and mines. 
(d) General supply and equipment sec-
tion. This section performs technical 
intelligence analysis and evaluation 
of general supplies; petroleum; 
clothing and textiles; subsistence; 
chemical, biological, and radiolog-
ical equipment; and photographic 
equipment. 
(e) Mobility section. This section per-
forms technical intelligence analy-
sis and evaluation of aeronautical, 
aerial delivery, surface transporta-
tion (marine and land), power 
generation, construction, barrier, 
and bridging equipment; general 
purpose vehicles such as amphibian 
vehicles to include cargo and utility 
vehicles and self-propelled, tracked, 
and bridging vehicles; and general 
support equipment and supplies. 
(I) Medical section. This section ana-
lyzes and evaluates foreign health 
problems and the organization, 
training, techniques, facilities, and 
materiel used by foreign medi-
cal services. In conj unction with 
chemical personnel in the weapons 
and munitions section and the mis-
cellaneous supply and equipment 
section, it assists in evaluating CBR 
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weapons effects information and ad-
vises on how they may affect oper-
ations. It also arranges for evacu-
ation of captured foreign medical 
materiel for further analysis or ex-
ploitation. (See paragraphs 24-27 
for the scope of medical technical 
intelligence. ) 
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CHAPTER 3 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION 
Section I. GENERAL 
13. Overall Concept 
u. The technical intelligence company con-
tains quarter~aster, signal, transportation, 
chemical, medical, engineer, and ordnance com-
bat service support personnel. These specialists 
provide the overall technical intelligence analy-
sis and evaluation capabilities of the unit 
through their extensive training, background, 
and experience. When employed as functional 
teams, technical analysis and evaluation is ac-
complished more effectively. This chapter dis-
cusses the functionalization concept as it ap-
plies to technical intelligence, covers the scope 
of the broad areas of technical intelligence, and 
discusses additional capabilities. 
b. The proper organization and employment 
of the combat service support specialists is 
critical to mission accomplishment. The com-
pany must operate within clearly defined objec-
tives, goals, and priorities prescribed by the 
field army commander. Personnel must not be 
given analysis tasks which can be more effi-
ciently performed by other field army or theater 
assets. 
c. Each functionally organized technical in-
telligence team must be tailored to perform its 
required mission. Teams must be flexible in 
their operations since personnel of the unit will 
be required to perform extensive coordination 
and liaison internally for mission success. 
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a spe-
cific technical intelligence function with con-
sideration given to the training and capabilities 
of the combat service support specialists. Sec-
tions must assist other sections in keeping 
abreast of trends and developments which have 
an impact on mutually related areas of interest. 
d. The functionalized areas of interest of 
technical specialists will frequently overlap. 
For example, transportation, engineer, com-
munication-electronics, and ordnance specialists 
may need to work together when a new tank is 
being analyzed. Also, medical and chemical spe-
cialists may overlap in CBR analysis missions. 
When possible, functional teams should be com-
posed of personnel having related functional 
qualifications. They can be "tailored" to form 
a working team in order to perform a specific 
technical examination and/or analysis mission. 
Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE 
14. Scope 
u. The scope and/or primary objectives of 
communication-electronics equipment are to--
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(1) Provide communication-electronics 
equipment intelligence concerning the 
capabilities and limitations of foreign 
communication systems, both civilian 
and military. 
(2) Provide the field army with intelli-
gence on captured communications 
equipment and systems. 
(3) Provide data for possible application 
in developing new US electronic equip-
ment and devices. 
(4) Provide communications-electronic 
equipment intelligence for strategic 
and tactical planning. 
(5) Assist in providing tactical and stra-
tegic estimates on enemy communica-
tion capabilities. 
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b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a 
continuous need to examine, analyze, and test 
communications-electronic equipment and de-
vices and to analyze enemy communication 
diagrams and schematics. Recent communica-
tion trends and developments necessitate that 
the scope of communications-electronic equip-
ment intelligence be broadened to include wire, 
radio, television, satellites, telemetering devices, 
electronic instruments, photography, com-
puters, radar, facsimile, crypto, and laser com-
munication equipment or devices. 
c. Communications-electronics specialists 
must maintain extensive liaison with other in-
telligence elements to include the U.S. Army Se-
curity Agency. They evaluate and interpret in-
formation concerning enemy electronic-com-
munications research and must keep abreast of 
civilian and industrial communication develop-
ments. In addition, they must exploit any tech-
nical data derived from other intelligence activ-
ities such as the U.S. Army Security Agency. 
Therefore, the technical library must have com-
munications and electronics information con-
cerning details and performance data on a wide 
variety of items. 
b. Specifically, communications-electronics 
specialists can perform the following: 
(1) Exploit intelligence from captured 
communication materiel. 
(2) Assist in the exploitation of foreign 
scientific communications-electronics 
information. 
(3) Prepare enemy communications-elec-
tronics intelligence studies. 
(4) Evaluate enemy communications-elec-
tronics equipment information as re-
ceived on a day-to-day basis. 
(5) Supervise the collection and evacu-
ation of enemy communications-elec-
tronics equipment. 
( 6) Provide limited assistance as may be 
required to other intelligence activities 
such as U.S. Army Security Agency 
and strategic intelligence elements. 
(7) Maintain, evaluate, and interpret in-
formation concerning military and 
civilian research and development. 
(8) Assist in the exploitation of foreign 
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communication complexes and facil-
ities by United States forces. 
e. Communications-electronics personnel 
may need to accompany combat elements whose 
missions include the capture of special com-
munication bases or targets for prompt analy-
sis and exploitation. They assist in photograph-
ing significant items of captured materiel; how-
ever, the section is dependent on signal units 
for photographic processing support. 
f. Other general areas of interest to com-
m unica tions-electronics equipment intelligence 
are-
(1) Acoustic equipment. 
(2) Missile guidance devices. 
(3) Power equipment. 
(4) Meteorological equipment. 
(5) Electronic countermeasures equip-
ment. 
(6) Guided missile control systems. 
g. Data in the following areas are of primary 
interest to communications-electronics equip-
ment intelligence production: 
(1) Output power. 
(2) Frequency range. 
(3) Bandwidth. 
(4) Modes of operation. 
( 5) Circuitry design. 
(6) Antenna design. 
(7) Anti-jamming features. 
(8) Tube structure. 
(9) Transistors. 
(10) Equipment ruggedness. 
(11) Maj or modifications. 
15. Additional Capabilities 
Signal personnel, in addition to their normal 
technical intelligence functions can-
a. Provide recommendations on the disposi-
tion of fixed and special communication instal-
lations and/or equipment. 
b. Provide limited analyses concerning radiac 
equipment and meters as well as electronic, 
chemical and/or biological warning devices, and 
instruments. 
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Section III. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE 
16. Scope 
a. Ballistics deals with the motion of projec-
tiles and the forces governing that motion. In 
practice, this subject is of interest to the weap-
ons and munitions analyst in analysis of small-
arms ammunitions, artillery shells, bombs, mis-
siles, and projectiles. Of particular importance 
to the tactical commander are their penetrating 
and fragmentation effects. The following items 
of inte1ligen~e interest can be analyzed by the 
weapons/munitions analysts: 
(1) Type of driving/rotating band (type 
of metal encircling projectile at the 
base). 
(2) Direction of weapon rifling. 
(3) Combustion rate of the powder or re-
peUant. 
(4) Chemical composition of powder. 
(5) Layering structure of grains in 
charge. 
(6) Grain perforation. 
(7) Size and shape of projectile. 
(8) Firing tables (if present). 
(9) Missiles. 
(10) The use made of substitute materials. 
b. The weapons and munitions technical ana-
lysts contribute to the knowledge of interior 
and exterior ballistics through their use of con-
tinually revised }landbooks, their knowledge of 
equations and formulas, energy motion and 
burning rules, and firing tables. The integra-
tion of this data establishes the relations be-
tween powder pressure, projectile travel, and 
velocity. All of these factors can contribute to 
meeting the overall needs of the tactical com-
mander; namely, analysis of enemy technical 
capabilities and how the tactical commander 
can best counter the enemy threat. 
c. Trajectories can be computed from a par-
ticular muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and 
ballistic coefficient using standard temperature, 
density. and no wind. Any variations from 
these conditions would be nonstandard. In 
ground fire, one of the most important elements 
is the determination of variations in range and 
displacement of the point of fall from all pos-
sible causes. Changes in muzzle velocity, angle 
of departure, and powder granules will cause 
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such variations. Firing tables can assist in pro-
ducing a wide variety of technical intelligence. 
Such tables are valuable since they include 
range elevations or tables for a particular gun, 
Also, they provide a series of tables of differen-
tial effects each of which gives the effect on 
range of some particular departure from 
standard conditions. Therefore, firing tables, 
when available, should always accompaI~y the 
weapon to which applicable and be handled in 
accordance with normal technical intelligence 
evacuation procedures. 
17. Functions 
Weapons and munitions specialists contribute 
to the following: 
a. Locating, identifying, examining, and sub-
mitting reports on tactical capabilities of for-
eign materiel and equipment. 
b. Providing technical guidance to corps 
technical collection teams. 
c. Evaluating technical information that 
flows in from the corps collection teams. 
d. Assisting in the breakdown and assembly 
of equipment. 
e. Assisting in testing of vehicles, equipment, 
and accessories. 
f. Inspecting vehicles to determine major 
modifications and changes. 
g. Assisting in analysis of parts, assemblies, 
engines, power trains, and chassis for collation, 
updating, or incorporation of data for technical 
intelligence manuals or handbooks. 
h. Performing analysis on missiles and asso-
ciated equipment. 
i. Assisting in the production of technical in-
telligence from factory markings. 
18. Additional Capabilities 
The weapons and munitions section includes 
chemical equipment analyst for the identifica-
tion and evaluation of flamethrowers, smoke 
generators, and other chemical weapons and 
munitions. 
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Section IV. GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE 
19. Scope 
a. Supply and equipment technical intelli-
gence personnel playa primary role in supply 
and maintenance technical intelligence and con-
tribute to the tactical mission through analysis 
and evaluation of enemy supplies and/or re-
sources. Specific areas of interest are subsist-
ence, individual equipment, clothing, general 
supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and such 
services such as graves registration, laundry, 
and bath. 
b. In the preparation of a technical intelli-
gence analysis of enemy combat service sup-
port, supply and equipment technical specialists 
must take into account enemy economic factors 
(e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial produc-
tion), the enemy labor force, and enemy tech-
nological capabilities. In this regard, close co-
ordination with strategic intelligence elements 
at field army level is imperative. 
c. Exploitation of enemy materiel begins as 
soon as its existence is discovered in order to 
determine the immediate tactical usefulness and 
significance of the materiel. Exploitation of 
materiel in the field is performed to the extent 
that field conditions and facilities permit. 
Exploitation in the field does not replace the 
need for exploitation in CONUS. Materiel that 
cannot be used or exploited in the field or thea-
ter of operations must be evacuated to the 
United States for complete detailed analysis 
and exploitation. 
20. Functions 
a. An increase, decrease, or other change in 
the enemy's supplies gives an indication of 
change in enemy combat service support capa-
bilities. The examination of captured items 
must, of necessity, involve a continuous study 
of the items themselves in conjunction with the 
applied sciences which made the development 
of these items possible. All analyses need to be 
evaluated in terms of the social and cultural 
environment of the enemy. 
b. In assembling supply and equipment in-
telligence information, supply and maintenance 
specialists analyze and evaluate foreign activ-
ities to include the following: 
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(1) Determining the design, performance, 
source and methods of manufacture, 
and methods of storing items. 
(2) Examining supply and maintenance 
organizations, installations, and stor-
age depots. 
(3) Determining characteristics, limita-
tions, vulnerabilities, and military 
potential of military and civilian 
facilities. 
(4) Processing and abstracting informa-
tion from foreign commodities and 
equipment acquired in a field army 
area of responsibility. 
( 5) Preparing technical intelligence re-
ports and studies concerning such 
items as petroleum, food, clothing, and 
equipment. 
(6) Assisting in the training of field army 
personnel in supply and equipment in-
telligence. 
(7) Producing and mai~taining informa-
tion and intelligence concerning for-
eign materiel and commodities. 
(8) Assisting in the analyses of enemy 
storage, packing, and preparation of 
food and equipment. 
21. Additional Capabilities 
a. In conj unction with other technical intelli-
gence specialists, supply and equipment special-
ists provide a capability to the field army for 
supervising battlefield collection of a wide var-
iety of items. For example, through the use of 
mobile laboratories available at theater level. 
the analysis, evaluation, and identification of 
captured foreign petroleum products and facil-
ities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated. 
b. Other areas of technical intelligence to 
which supply and maintenance specialists can 
contribute through analysis are-
(1) Troop subsistence supplies. 
(2) Commodity items. 
(3) Food spoilage and contamination. 
(4) Packaging and marking. 
(5) Acquisition of data concerning draft 
animals and protective clothing. 
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c. Supply and maintenance technical intelli-
gence personnel can perform the following for 
order of battle intelligence: 
(1) Identifications based upon enemy uni-
forms, insignia, and decorations. 
(2) Maintain supply and equipment intel-
ligence files as they pertain to logis-
tics. 
d. The section also includes highly trained 
chemical personnel for the operation of the 
CBR agent sampling and analyzing kit. The 
operation of this kit is under the supervision of 
a chemical officer who is an organic chemist. 
Chemical personnel assigned to the general 
supply and equipment section evaluate chemical 
defense equipment, including individual and 
collective protection equipment, and decontami-
nation equipment and supplies. 
Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE 
22. Scope 
a. The scope of mobility intelligence is com-
prehensive. It covers most aspects of engineer 
and transportation activity at all echelons of 
the enemy's military organization. Engineer 
and transportation support is of a greater 
variety today and has become increasingly more 
important in all types of military operations. 
Also, there has been an increasing use of all 
types of engineer and transportation equipment 
by supply and transport agencies of all armies. 
b. The mobility technical intelligence special-
ists will usually be involved in both strategic 
and tactical technical intelligence. The field 
army technical intelligence company will have 
to meet the needs of the theater and lower 
levels. Frequently, the same items of mobility 
intelligence may be needed by numerous levels 
within the field army and the theater. For 
example, the condition and capacity of highway 
and railroad facilities in a contiguous geograph-
ical area may influence the decision to launch a 
certain military operation. Therefore, mobility 
intelligence will play an important part in the 
overall strategic and tactical planning for field 
army and theater forces. 
C'. Mobility specialists can contribute to CBR 
intelligence in a variety of ways. Because of 
their training, the engineers can assist in stud-
ies to evaluate the destructive effects of nuclear 
weapons on the terrain, aboveground and 
underground structures, installations, equip-
ment, and stored supplies. Mobility specialists 
contribute intelligence repori.q and studies on 
such items as soils, structures, facilities, and 
man-made objects such &q roads, railroads, 
bridges, airfields, ports, utilities, urban areas, 
and military installations. 
16 
23. Functions 
a. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to 
limited analyses and evaluation of technical 
intelligence concerning the following: 
(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include 
its capabilities. 
(2) Enemy construction operations, tech-
niques, and resources. 
(3) Lines of communication (roads, 
bridges, waterways, etc.). 
(4) Public utilities. 
(5) Materiel quality and shortages. 
(6) Enemy depots, dumps, and supply 
points. 
(7) Defenses and fortifications. 
(8) Town plan analysis and urban area 
studies. 
(9) Water-crossing equipment and tech-
niques. 
(10) Maintenance of a bibliography of 
foreign military and civilian engineer 
specialists and engineer order of 
battle. 
(11) Airborne drop zones. 
(12) Underground facilities and tunnels. 
7>. Transportation mobility specialists in the 
mobility section can contribute primarily to the 
production of mobility intelligence concerning 
all foreign air, land, and water transportation 
systems of immediate or potential military im-
portance. This intelligence concerns character-
istics, conditions, development, organization, 
materiel, operation, maintenance, construction, 
performance, capabilities, and limiting factors 
of enemy and/or selected foreign transporta-
tion systems and facilities (e.g., highways, rail-
ways, waterways, ports, harbors, industrial, 
and scientific installations and transportation 
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supplies). Mobility intelligence is necessary for 
contingency planning and emergency opera-
tions. Therefore, transportation specialists 
will need to produce intelligence on adj acent 
friendly countries for use by technical and 
strategic planners and combat service support 
elements. Frequently, the United States may 
use another nation's transportation system. 
c. Mobility specialists can contribute to the 
following: 
(1) Integration and coordination of the 
transportation collection effort. 
(2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, 
and dissemination of transportation 
information and data. 
(3) Assistance in the preparation of 
transportation estimates. 
(4) Assistance in the interrogation of 
civilian and military personnel having 
transportation intelligence informa-
tion. 
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation 
planning. 
(6) Evaluation of new transportation 
modes, systems, and related equipment. 
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate 
of enemy capabilities to transport 
missiles and nuclear weapons. 
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical 
aspects of foreign transportation sys-
tems. 
(9) Compilation of data on enemy and/or 
foreign transportation modes, sys-
tems, facilities, and equipment. 
Section VI. MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 
24. Scope of Medical Intelligence 
a. Medical intelligence is a functional entity 
and should not be fragmented. Medical techni-
cal intelligence is not primarily materiel ori-
ented. Examination, evaluation, and classifica-
tion of medical materiel are only segments of 
the total medical technical intelligence effort. 
If possible, medical intelligence must retain 
integrity so that the end product will include 
all available information affecting the health 
and welfare of men and animals in actual or 
possible areas of military operation which is 
immediately or potentially significant. Such 
information is vital in both strategic and tac-
tical planning and may influence military oper-
ations. 
b. The field army surgeon can assist in 
providing requirements for medical informa-
tion/intelligence to the command G2. The in-
telligence produced should be coordinated and 
evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff 
prior to dissemination. 
c. The theater command can provide valuable 
assistance and guidance to the field army medi-
cal technical intelligence effort. The theater 
surgeon can coordinate the employment of med-
ical units in support of medical intelligence 
activities and arrange for support of field army 
medical intelligence activities by theater level 
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units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and 
staff can assist the field army G2 in determin-
ing potential tactical and strategic applications 
of fully evaluated medical intelligence produced 
by field army technical intelligence elements. 
25. Medical Intelligence Functions 
The following specific technical intelligence 
functions are performed by medical specialists: 
a. Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate 
raw information concerning non-US health 
problems, training, and materiel used by for-
eign medical services. 
b. Provide medical intelligence information 
to the field army surgeon through G2 for pro-
fessional evaluation prior to dissemination. 
c. Assist in the interrogation of prisoners of 
war, refugees, deflectors, and escapees to obtain 
medical information. 
d. Assist in the investigation of medical as-
pects of incidents involving diseases or enemy 
CBR operations. 
e. Accomplish initial examination and evacu-
ation of captured foreign medical materiel to 
include escort of live cultures to CONUS. 
f. Assist in the compilation of environmental 
data pertinent to health aspects of military 
operations. 
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g. Provide technical staff advice on medical 
intelligence to include the scope of medical 
subjects to be incorporated into medical unit 
training programs. 
h. Provide limited analysis on drugs, serums, 
and antibiotics. 
26. Sources 
The principal sources of medical information 
of potential intelligence value include-
a. Direct observation of patients and medical 
service operations, both military and civilian. 
b. Discussions with personnel involved di-
rectly or indirectly with medical service opera-
tions (enemy, allied, or civilian). 
c. Study of military and civilian reports and 
publications of a medical or technical nature. 
d. Prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, dis-
placed persons, and friendly escapees. 
e. Examination of enemy medical materiel, 
facilities, and personnel prQtective devices. 
f. Civil affairs public health teams who ob-
tain information on the public health services 
and facilities in an area of operation. 
27. Additional Capabilities 
In addition to their normal technical respon-
sibilities, medical technical intelligence person-
nel can perform the following: 
a. Assist in the identification of CBR agents. 
b. Assist in the evaluation of CBR weapons. 
c. Provide information and data on medical 
aspects of enemy combat operations. 
d. Assist as required in the preparation of 
medical studies and reports of tactical signifi-
cance. 
e. Collect data regarding enemy military and 
civilian medical facilities. 
f. Provide advice on communicable diseases. 
g. Provide limited analysis of drugs and 
serums. 
Section VII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
28. Scope 
For purposes of this manual, chemical, 
biological, and radiological (CBR) technical in-
telligence includes the following tasks and 
functions: 
a. The collection, examination, evaluation, 
identification, and dissemination of information 
on equipment, materiel, and documents per-
taining to chemical, biological, and radiological 
operations under conditions of nuclear or non-
nuclear warfare. 
b. The collection of samples of chemical, 
biological, and radiological agents employed 
against friendly forces; the identification of 
chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples 
to a supporting- general chemical laboratory for 
analysis; the transmittal of biological samples 
to a supporting medical laboratory for analysis; 
and the collection and forwarding of radiologi-
cal samples to a supporting general chemical 
laboratory for determination of radio isotopic 
composition. 
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c. The determination and dissemination of 
information pertaining to enemy techniques 
and procedures of decontamination; individual 
and collective protection; CBR agent detection 
and identification procedures, fallout predic-
tions and procedures for CBR attack warning; 
radiological monitoring and survey operations; 
impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing; 
field laboratory services; and assistance in de-
termination of enemy organization and opera-
tional effectiveness in chemical, biological, and 
radiological operations under conditions of 
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. 
d. The collection and dissemination of infor-
mation about foreign chemical and biological 
production and storage installations, facilities, 
capabilities, and stockpiles. 
e. Assistance, within the technical intelli-
gence company capabilities, in developing field 
countermeasures against chemical, biological, 
and radiological operations under conditions of 
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The use of 
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chemical and biological munitions introduces 
new factors into technical intelligence oper-
ations. In this area, the most critical function 
of the technical analyst lies in determining the 
effectiveness of such munitions, technical char-
acteristics, detection, unique modifications, and 
the need to develop rapidly effective counter-
measures. Close coordination with the theater 
general chemical laboratory, with army medical 
service laboratories, and with staff chemical 
officers is essential because of the constantly 
developing and changing state of the art. 
29. Nature of Chemical, Biological, and 
Radiological Technical Intelligence 
a. Chemical, biological, and radiological tech-
nical intelligence is an integral part of the total 
military intelligence effort and is essential to 
military operations. The possibility or proba-
bility of use by the enemy of chemical, biologi-
cal, and radiological weapons, the enemy level 
of training, the effectiveness of enemy offensive 
and defensive equipment, the potential for wag-
ing CBR operations, and the capability to 
defend against these weapons are important 
considerations at every level of military plan-
ning. The impact that employment of CBR 
operations will have on friendly forces makes 
timely technical intelligence information essen-
tial. The initiation of CBR operations can 
change the entire course of a war. The CBR 
technical intelligence organizational require-
ments generally fall into two functional cate-
gories-
(1) An organization for the collection 
effort. 
(2) An organization for the evaluation 
and analysis effort. 
b. The collecting of CBR technical intelli-
gence is, for the most part, dependent on the 
effectiveness of the overall intelligence collec-
tion plan using all available sources of informa-
tion. On-the-spot preliminary evaluation and 
dissemination of significant information may 
be done in connection with the collection effort 
when the situation warrants, but final detailed 
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analysis will not always be accomplished by 
technical intelligence collecting personnel. Prior 
to use of CBR weapons, enemy capabilities to 
employ these weapons must be considered as 
well as the magnitude and location of the prob-
able employment and the enemy capability to 
defend against surprise employment of these 
weapons by friendly forces. Once these weap-
ons have been employed, priority in the collec-
tion effort shifts to identification of agents em-
ployed; tactics, techniques, and procedures 
used; information on new weapons and agents; 
size and location of stockpiles; and targets for 
engagement. 
30. Functions 
Chemical personnel in technical intelligence 
units assist field army commanders in the fol-
lowing areas: 
a. Examining captured CBR materiel. 
b. Examining, evaluating, and identifying, 
when possible, equipment related to CBR oper-
ations. 
c. Assisting personnel, as may be required, in 
the identification of biological agents. 
d. Providing technical assistance to army 
and corps staff on CBR matters. 
e. Maintaining liaison with chemical mobile 
laboratory teams. 
f. Preparing intelligence reports and esti-
mates. 
g. Assisting, as required, in the location and 
evaluation of CBR targets. 
31. Additional Capabilities 
Chemical personnel have the following addi-
tional capabilities: 
a. Assisting in laboratory analysis of POL 
products and, in conjunction with medical 
laboratory personnel, determining the effects 
of chemical and biological agents on POL prod-
ucts. 
b. Collecting CBR samples following enemy 
attack for analysis and delivery to supporting 
laboratories for identification. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND COLLECTION 
Section I. PLANNING 
32. General 
a. Effective technical intelligence production 
requires broad planning in a variety of techni-
cal areas. Extensive planning outside the tech-
nical intelligence company will frequently be 
required to fulfill all production responsibilities 
especially in some highly technical areas such as 
electronics, missiles, and sensors (app II). 
b. A continuous requirement exists for de-
tailed technical intelligence planning in pre-
paring estimates of enemy tactical capabilities 
that have been or will be fielded in the near 
future. 
33. Command Responsibilities 
a. The collection and production of technical 
information are a function of command. The 
complex nature and importance of technical 
intelligence requires that a commander use all 
the means available to insure its success. Tac-
tical commanders and units are the key to suc-
cessful execution of technical intelligence plans. 
Prior technical planning is required for combat 
missions; otherwise the technical intelligence 
production cycle may be disrupted. 
b. Intelligence staffs at all echelons are re-
sponsible for detailed planning concerning the 
exploitation of captured enemy equipment, ma-
teriel, installations, facilities, and commodity 
items within their area of responsibility. They 
must insure that-
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(1) Members of the command are properly 
trained in the recognition, proper 
handling, and reporting of captured 
enemy equipment, materiel, and docu-
ments. 
(2) New or unusual equipment/materiel 
or equipment modifications remain in 
place, if possible, for exploitation by 
appropriate intelligence personnel. 
(3) Proper safeguards are provided for 
captured equipment/materiel to pre-
vent looting or retention as souvenir 
items. 
(4) Appropriate reports on captured 
enemy equipment and materiel are 
furnished to higher headquarters. 
(5) Technical intelligence collection per-
sonnel supervise and direct the evacu-
ation of captured or abandoned enemy 
materiel from collection points 
throughout the field army area. 
34. Operational Planning 
The technical intelligence company is re-
sponsible for internal planning as it affects 
analysis, evaluation, integration, and produc-
tion of technical intelligence necessary to 
satisfy overall field army needs. 
35. Additional Planning Factors 
a. It is imperative that technical intelligence 
management, planning, and production be 
standardized to minimize duplication of effort 
and dissipation of resources. For example, re-
port standardization facilitates planning, pro-
duction, assignment of responsibility for spe-
cific items, collation of resources, programing, 
meeting time schedules, and dissemination of 
the end product. 
b. Effective technical intelligence planning 
is characterized by the following (app III) : 
(1) Mission analysis. 
(2) Requirements and priorities are bal-
anced with collection and production 
capabilities. 
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(3) Proper intelligence collection agencies 
are assigned. 
( 4) Proper functional teams are formed 
for maximum equipment and materiel 
exploita tion. 
(5) Vital support areas are considered, 
such as equipment tags, evacuation 
procedures, and establishment of spe-
cific collection points for foreign 
materiel. 
c. Planning consideration must continually 
be given to the quality of technical intelligence 
production, its responsiveness to needs, and 
costs of the overall production effort. Technical 
intelligence is a time-consuming process which 
requires imagination and insight into its oper-
ation. 
36. Requests for Technical Intelligence 
a. Requests for tactical technical intelligence 
are submitted through intelligence channels 
and must be as specific as possible for planning 
purposes. Further, requests based on previous 
technical and/or combat intelligence reports 
should fully identify such reports. Requests 
must be carefully screened to prevent over-
statement of requirements. 
b. Requests for technical intelligence should 
follow theater policies and include, as a mini-
mum, the following: 
(1) Requesting organization. 
(2) Specific requirement. 
(3) Scope of requirement. 
(4) Reason for requirement. 
(5) Pertinent data of assistance to techni-
cal intelligence personnel. 
(6) Date desired. 
(7) References (if applicable). 
Section II. COLLECTION 
37. General 
a. In the direction of the overall intelligence 
collection effort, the technical intelligence com-
pany and corps field collection teams must con-
tinually coordinate their collection efforts with 
unit intelligence personnel at the small unit 
level through periodic visits, dissemination of 
guidance, and emphasis on the importance and 
timeliness of technical intelligence and cap-
tured equipment from all possible sources. Most 
materiel, equipment, and documents captured 
will be collected by frontline tactical units. 
Other items of equipment and materiel may be 
captured in raids, found abandoned in overrun 
areas, seized, requisitioned, purchased, or con-
fiscated by civil affairs units. Only through a 
continual indoctrination effort at all echelons 
can maximum effectiveness of the technical 
collection effort be achieved. 
b. There are many information collection 
and production elements that are capable of 
providing support to technical intelligence units 
in the discharge of their responsibilities. Some 
sources of assistance are-
(1) Order of battle. 
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(2) Strategic intelligence. 
(3) Special operations. 
( 4) Counterintelligence. 
(5) G2 air. 
(6) Interrogation of prisoners of war. 
(7) Long range patrols. 
(8) Civil affairs units and teams. 
38. The Collection Effort 
a. The overall intelligence collection plan or 
schedule will select those intelligence collection 
assets which can best fulfill the collection needs 
of the technical intelligence company for the 
production of technical intelligence, (e.g., long 
range patrols and corps technical intelligence 
collection teams). The technical intelligence 
unit should make frequent recommendations 
for inclusion in the overall intelligence collec-
tion plan to insure that its specific equipment 
and materiel needs, including technical docu-
ments, manuals, and photographs, are met. 
Critical components of bulky equipment and 
materiel must be completely identified to aid 
the collector in his collection efforts. In addi-
tion, when component elements of a piece of 
equipment are required, identification must be 
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complete and specific to preclude collection of 
a complete item when only a portion is required. 
Also, provisions must be made to insure collec-
tion of items of opportunity. 
b. Frequently, many priority collection re-
quirements will revolve around the Items-
Wanted List (IWL). This is an alphabetical 
listing containing information, artist sketches, 
and/ or photographs of equipment and materiel 
which are required by higher echelons and 
agencies for intelligence purposes, testing, 
evaluation, planning, or study. The equipment 
contained in the listing must be evacuated im-
mediately. Technical intelligence collection per-
sonnel at corps must be frequently briefed on 
this list, 2nd tactical units must receive instruc-
tions on what to do should the items be 
acquired. 
c. Technical intelligence collection requires a 
system of priorities since some types of infor-
mation and/or equipment will always be more 
critical than others. The intelligence staff must 
use a collection schedule with established prior-
ities prepared as far in advance as possible. If 
it is known, for example, that transportation 
equipment studies will be prepared each year, 
technical equipment and materiel needed for 
this requirement must be incorporated on a con-
tinuous basis into the overall collection plan. 
Collection requirements for technical informa-
tionwill need to be programed in advance by 
the technical intelligence unit to insure inclu-
sion of its own requirements as well as those 
of other headquarters. 
d. The theater prepares technical intelligence 
directives and levies collection tasks, usually in 
accordance with DOD requirements, on appro-
priate technical intelligence and/or intelligence 
units to meet specific needs. The field army G2 
staff element f1.pecifically controls technical in-
telligence by collating collection requirements 
with those tasks which have aready been de-
veloped or which are in the process of being 
developed. 
Section III. COLLECTION AGENCIES AND LIAISON 
39. Agencies 
A technical intelligence collection agency 
refers to a person, unit, organization, or instru-
mentality which collects or acquires technical 
data. This varies from routine troop collection 
to collection by research, observation, analysis 
and evaluation, or interrogation. Some intelli-
gence collection agencies that contribute to the 
overall technical intelligence program are com-
bat troops, military intelligence battalion collec-
tion elements, corps technical intelligence collec-
tion teams, and civil affairs units. Also, 
psychological operations units and special 
forces operational detachments can contribute 
to the collection as long as they are not de-
tracted from their primary missions. 
a. Combat Troops. Troops in combat are 
usually the first to encounter enemy materiel or 
new or modified foreign materiel, sometimes 
with documents intact. The intelligence officer 
at each appropriate level must insure that cap-
tured equipment and/or documents are re-
covered for technical intelligence exploitation. 
It is imperative that vital technical intelligence 
materiel and equipment and new discoveries be 
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exempt from destruction. Every effort must be 
made to insure that enemy equipment, materiel, 
documents, and logistical complexes are 
promptly safeguarded and reported to an ele-
ment of the technical intelligence company so 
that the maximum technical information can 
be obtained. These principles must be thor-
oughly considered and implemented in all oper-
ational plans and briefings at each level of com-
mand. They should be emphasized in unit train-
ing programs. 
b. Intelligence Persornnel. Personnel of in-
telligence sections and field army intelligence 
units will come in contact with numerous tech-
nical documents, data, information dealing with 
foreign materiel, and military and civilian per-
sonnel who are excellent sources of technical in-
formation. Therefore, frequent coordination 
and liaison between the technical intelligence 
company personnel and intelligence elements 
at all echelons is mandatory. 
c. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection 
Teams. These teams are trained to collect and 
search for tactical information on foreign ma-
teriel, facilities, methods, techniques, and tech-
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nical activities. These units work with various 
corps elements and contact front-line tactical 
elements for collection of materiel. The teams 
are organic to the corps and assist primarily in 
carrying out the technical intelligence collection 
responsibility. 
d. Civil Affairs Units. The civil affairs or-
ganization consists of staffs, units, and func-
tional teams. Civil affairs units provide com-
mand support or area support to tactical or 
administrative units and are designed to sup-
port civil affairs operations at specific echelons 
of command or level of government. The size 
and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellu-
lar functional teams may vary; ho\vever, the 
personnel assigned to them are trained special-
ists who are technically qualified to provide as-
sistance in various specialized functional areas 
which are considered to be in the normal range 
of technical intelligence units. These areas 
include-
(1) Food and agriculture. 
(2) Public communications. 
(3) Public health. 
(4) Public transportation. 
(5) Civilian supply. 
(6) Public works and utilities. 
(6) Commerce and industry. 
e. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Units. 
These units perform psychological operations 
functions in support of theater and field army, 
corps, and division. Personnel of PSYOP units 
possess and can lend assistance in special skills~ 
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technical knowledge, and the use of such items 
as radio, loudspeaker, and printing equipment. 
40. Collection Liaison 
Frequent coordination and liaison are re-
quired between the technical intelligence com-
pany and field army intelligence elements at 
all subordinate tactical echelons. Army intelli-
gence units can provide many items of captured 
enemy materiel. Frequent visits must be pro-
gramed by technical intelligence elements to 
key tactical units with actual or potential ac-
cess to enemy or foreign materiel. In addition, 
liaison is required among key combat, combat 
support, and combat service support elements. 
Effective liaison aids in insuring that the fol-
lowing are accomplished for the collection ef-
fort: 
a. Enemy equipment is promptly secured, 
safeguarded and evacuated. 
b. Locally procured indigenous items are 
quickly identified together with their sources. 
c. Coordination with allied collection agen-
cies achieves maximum value and enemy equip-
ment obtained by allied intelligence counter-
parts reaches US technical intelligence chan-
nels. 
d. Technical intelligence personnel are kept 
current on technical trends and developments. 
e. Intelligence collection plans are fulfilled 
and kept current. 
f. Combat and combat support units are 
thoroughly indoctrinated on their technical in-
telligence roles. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPTURED MATERIEL EVACUATION 
Section I. GENERAL 
41. Concept 
a. Captured materiel with explanatory tech-
nical documents is one of the most important 
sources of technical intelligence. Combined 
with technical interrogation reports and other 
intelligence data, this source can lead to valu-
able combat intelligence on enemy capabilities 
limitations, and probable courses of action: 
Every effort must be made to insure that cap-
tured materiel and documents of intelligence 
value are immediately placed into technical in-
telligence channels for prompt exploitation. 
b. Exploitation of captured materiel takes 
place both in the theater of operations and in 
the CONUS base. Final, complete, and detailed 
analysis is performed in CONUS. Captured 
materiel of technical intelligence interest can 
be exploited at predesignated collection points 
at division, corps, field army, and/or theater. 
Technical intelligence collection teams can be 
sent forward to echelons below division collec-
tion points to examine materiel when needed. 
If necessary, captured materiel can be evacu-
ated directly from the division collection point 
to the technical intelligence company at field 
army for exploitation. Collection points at 
theater army support command (TASCOM) 
can be utilized to augment those resources 
located in the field army service support area. 
All items for CONUS exploitation are for-
warded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence 
Officer (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland (para 95b). 
42. Report Credibility 
All technical reports produced by the tech-
nical intelligence company should bear the fol-
lowing statement on the cover to give official 
credence to the report: 
This is a United States Army Technical In-
telligence Report. The data contained herein 
was derived through limited testing, analysis, 
and examination utilizing U.S. Army Labora-
tory and test facilities. 
Section II. RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
43. Collecting Points 
Maintenance collecting points are designated 
facilities to which captured or abandoned for-
eign materiel is evacuated for temporary stor-
age and proper disposition in accordance with 
technical intelligence requirements. Collecting 
points operate, where needed, throughout the 
theater of operations. In the field army area, 
one or more collecting points can be provided 
for each corps area and for the field army 
service area. In the division areas, maintenance 
collecting points are operated by the division 
maintenance battalion. Evacuation flow through 
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collecting points is as shown in figure 3. The 
unit specifically designed to operate collecting 
points in the field army service area is the 
collection and classification company (TOE 29-
139) assigned to the army support brigade. 
Collecting points operate for the classification, 
segregation, disassembly, and disposition of 
serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel 
in accordance with guidance and instructions 
provided by the field army commander. 
44. Equipment Recovery Guidelines 
Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation 
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Figwre 8. Captured equipment evacuation flow. 
(Use depends upon the nature of the item, the avail-
ability of transportation, the current situation, etc.) 
of foreign materiel at various levels are similar 
to those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of 
items of foreign materiel, however, will be re-
ported by the capturing unit through intelli-
gence channels. Items for which there are no 
disposition instructions should not be evacu-
ated until coordinated with technical intelli-
gence elements. The capturing unit must sub-
mit a preliminary technical report to the in-
telligence officer of its higher headquarters. 
(See annex B of app IV.) The capturing unit 
may be directed to evacuate the item to the 
collection and classification company or guard 
it and leave it in place for on-the-spot prelimi-
nary screening by technical intelligence person-
nel. When materiel does not have to remain in 
place for intelligence evaluation and the dis-
covering unit is incapable of evacuating it, the 
unit may request evacuation assistance directly 
from the command responsible for direct sup-
port maintenance. Evacuation may be direct 
from a maintenance collecting point to the tech-
nical intelligence company at field army in ac-
cordance with the following guidelines: 
a. Foreign materiel may be of value for tech-
nical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized 
by friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be 
cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to pre-
vent recapture or reclamation by the enemy or 
by guerrilla forces. 
b. Technical intelligence elements of the mili-
tary intelligence battalion and the intelligence 
officers of all commands are interested in cap-
tured or abandoned items of foreign materiel. 
Procedures must be established for the screen-
ing and evacuation of all materiel. Implement-
ing instructions are published by subordinate 
commands in the form of directives and SOP's. 
c. Items of foreign materiel being evacuated 
directly to the field army support area are 
reported through higher headquarters to the 
technical intelligence company and held until 
disposition instructions are provided or respon-
sibility is assumed by another activity such as 
the technical intelligence company. 
d. Items which are of no use either for tech-
nical intelligence or for equipping friendly 
forces are demilitarized and disposed of as 
directed by higher headquarters. 
e. General support maintenance units of the 
field army support command direct support 
units in recovery and evacuation operations by 
providing backup recovery and evacuation sup-
port. Such support is limited and is of an 
emergency nature. Detailed information on 
recovery and evacuation procedures is con-
tained in FM 29-22. 
Section III. COLLECTION TEAMS, EXAMINATION, TAGGING, AND EVACUATION 
45. Functions of Corps Technical Intelligence 
Collection Teams 
a. The corps technical intelligence coordina-
tor on the corps G2 staff must work closely 
with the technical intelligence collection teams 
that operate within the corps areas of responsi-
bility. Close liaison will be necessary since the 
corps technical intelligence coordinator must 
depend upon the collection teams for prelimi-
nary examination, analyses, evaluation, and 
assistance in evacuation of equipment acquired 
by the corps tactical elements. 
b. The primary functions of the technical in-
telligence collection teams are to establish 
liaison and coordination with the collection and 
classification companies that operate collecting 
points for foreign materiel; to render support 
to corps tactical field elements in collection; 
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perform on-the-spot technical examination; 
provide technical advice and supervise the 
evacuation of equipment, as required. The 
teams assist in equipment identification; pro-
vide instructions and insight on the use of 
enemy equipment; provide countermeasure ad-
vice; and recommend on-the-spot destruction 
of captured enemy materiel, if necessary. In 
addition, they assist corps subordinate unit in-
telligence officers in the accomplishment of 
their individual technical intelligence responsi-
bilities, and provide limited technical intelli-
gence data through the use of technical hand-
books and/or reference books. They collect, 
examine, select, and expedite evacuation of for-
eigh equipment and materiel throughout the 
corps area as directed. In addition, they are 
responsible for-
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(1) Preparing special reports on signifi-
cant enemy equipment. 
(2) Providing limited technical advice and 
user instructions on the use of cap-
tured equipment by US forces. 
c. In a fast-moving, fluid tactical situation, 
it is imperative that technical intelligence col-
lection teams located at corps come forward to 
tactical units to analyze captured equipment or 
materiel. This is necessary to prevent loss of 
potentially vital technical intelligence. Photo-
graphs, sketches, diagrams, and general obser-
vation of equipment must be made to prevent 
total loss of technical intelligence should the 
equipment be recaptured or the area overrun, 
or should the equipment have to be destroyed 
in place to prevent recapture. 
46. Examination Obiectives 
a. The first objective of technical intelligence 
analysis (after enemy materiel is captured) is 
to obtain information of tactical value to com-
bat forces. Information obtained includes the 
following: 
(1) Determination of equipment oper-
ational characteristics, performance, 
capabilities, and vulnerabilities. 
(2) Recognition of new significant weap-
ons. 
(3) Identification. 
(4) Analysis for modifications. 
(5) Countermeasures. 
(6) Identifying and properly handling 
radioactive materiel. 
b. Effective technical intelligence is derived 
from data acquired by actual examination, field 
testing (when possible), limited laboratory 
analysis, and integration with other known in-
telligence data. Examination and analysis 
should be performed using any accompanying 
foreign language documents captured with the 
materiel. 
47. Marking and Tagging 
To facilitate segregation, collection, further 
detailed analysis, and shipment of materiel for 
intelligence purposes, weather-resistant equip-
ment tags produced locally within the theater 
are securely attached to the item itself and to 
the shipping container (figs. 4 and 5). 
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TO BE AFFIXED TO CAPTURED 
ENEMY EQUIPMENT 
DO NOT DISTURB 
NOMENCLATURE: _______ _ 
SERIAL NO: _________ _ 
DATE CAPTURED: 
WHERE CAPTURED: _______ _ 
CAPTURING UNIT: _______ _ 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: ___ _ 
CONDITION: _________ _ 
NOTICE 
THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING 
HELD FOR: 
ANALYSIS 
UTILIZATION 
SALVAGE 
DESTRUCTION 
BY AUTHORITY OF JOINT/ 
UNIFIED/THEATRE/FIELD 
ARMY COMMANDER: 
(Signature) 
(Unit) 
DO NOT DISTURB 
(DO NOT DISTURB) 
(In language of area of operations) 
Figure 4. Equipment marking tag. 
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a. Equipment tags accompany the materiel 
to its final destination. Article 103, Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, is printed on the 
reverse side of the tag to forestall tampering 
(fig. 5). 
b. In addition to the establishment of proper 
safeguards, all military personnel should re-
ceive training in equipment tagging responsi-
bility in conjunction with other intelligence 
training and in the consequences of failure to 
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ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
a. All persons subject to this code shall secure all public 
property taken from the enemy for the service of the United 
States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper au-
thority, without delay, all captured or abandoned property in 
their possession, custody or control. 
b. Any person subject to this code who: 0) fails to carry 
out the duties prescribed in subdivision (a) of this article; 
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of 
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or 
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another 
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in 
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct. 
Figure 5. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103. 
execute this responsibility. Also, troops must 
be indoctrinated not to deface original mark-
ings on materiel at the time of its capture. 
sponsibility of the recovery and shipping sec-
tion of the technical intelligence company in 
accordance with field army and theater policies. 
However, the section must depend upon field 
army support command elements for the prepa-
ration and shipment of bulky items. 
c. Tagging, marking, crating, and prepara-
tion for shipment to CONUS is the major re-
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48. Evacuation Guidance 
The general plans, policies, and procedures 
for evacuation of all foreign equipment and 
materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/ 
theater and field army headquarters. These 
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general plans normally are based upon DA and 
D IA policies and guidance. Each command 
echelon within the field army must insure that 
its plans are in accordance with field army 
directives and the overall field army technical 
intelligence plan. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROCESSING OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
Section I. PROCESSING 
49. Technical Information Processing 
a. At times, the wide range of technical ex-
pertise necessary for mission accomplishment 
will not be found within the technical intelli-
gence company. Normally, the broad range of 
technical equipment/materiel will necessitate 
the highest degree of functional coordination 
within the technical intelligence company in the 
utilization of varied experience, technical train-
ing, and background. 
b. Processing is the first step in the intelli-
gence cycle whereby technical information be-
comes intelligence. The three phases of tech-
nical intelligence processing are-
(1) Recording. 
(2) Evaluation. 
(3) Interpretation. 
c. In urgent situations, technical information 
can be processed as received without waiting 
to collect additional supporting information if 
background files and an adequate data base 
have been accumulated and kept current. The 
intelligence produced in such a situation may be 
crucial, if, for example, the intelligence derived 
contains data on missiles capable of carrying 
nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. 
50. Recording 
Recording is the first step in processing. 
Technical information and data are recorded in 
journals and workbooks and in intelligence files 
to aid technical analyst in grouping related 
items of information and to facilitate evalua-
tion and interpretation. Recording involves re-
ducing information and data to written or 
graphic form and grouping together related 
data to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. 
Recording facilitates the preparation and dis-
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semination of technical intelligence reports and 
makes subsequent interpretation and evluation 
easier. Commonly used combat intelligence aids, 
such as the intelligence worksheet and intelli-
gence journals, can be adapted for technical 
intelligence needs. When the need is urgent, the 
recording step can be omitted to permit more 
rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediate 
dissemination to tactical units. 
51. Evaluation 
Evaluation determines the pertinence of in-
formation. It consists of the critical appraisal 
of data for its subsequent interpretation. It in-
cludes determining the reliability of the source 
and agency and the accuracy or credibility of 
the information. The system applicable to 
evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been 
standardized for use by NATO Forces and 
other allies. 
a. Evaluation involves systematically ar-
ranging all pieces of information and compar-
ing known data with the current state of the 
art. This process must be carried on continually 
at all appropriate echelons. As technical infor-
mation flows to the technical intelligence com-
pany, it must be associated with all related data 
including previous technical reports. 
b. Evaluation requires a comprehensive tech-
nical knowledge which rarely is possessed by 
one individual. Evaluation, therefore, will re-
quire close coordination witltin the technical 
intelligence company. 
c. Technical evaluation must take into con-
sideration the industrial and scientific base and 
capability of the enemy. Evaluation estimates 
based solely on United States standards must 
be avoided. Foreign equipment and materiel 
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may appear wholly inferior when judged by 
American standards; however, when judged by 
the standards of the specific army and area in 
which they were developed, the items of equip-
ment may be superior and considered to be 
highly effective. 
d. Evaluation ratings should be made at the 
technical intelligence company. The evaluation 
step of processing is never omitted. 
52. Interpretation 
This step is the result of critical judgment 
evolving from evaluation and subsequent analy-
sis, integration, and deduction. It is the mental 
process of determining the importance of infor-
mation, integration of this with other technical 
data, and deduction. The analysis function is 
centralized in the evaluation and analysis pla-
toon of the technical intelligence company, since 
frequent coordination within the company is 
necessary to fully exploit the wide variety of 
equipment and materiel. The field army G2 
staff element integrates the analyzed technical 
information with intelligence produced by all 
other intelligence elements to arrive at an esti-
mate of the capabilities and limitations of for-
eign military armed forces. 
a. Analysis. Analysis requires a thorough 
knowledge of enemy equipment and materiel 
to include past technological trends, develop-
ments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use. 
Analysis involves detailed research when the 
volume of technical data increases. 
b. Integration. 
( 1 ) This step is lengthy and consists of 
combining numerous isolated elements 
of technical information with other 
technical data to form a logical con-
clusion. More than one technical con-
clusion may be formulated based upon 
other existing and finished intelli-
gence. Technical intelligence conclu-
sions are made with primary empha-
sis upon the tactical mission. This 
phase requires good judgment, experi-
ence, a varied background knowledge, 
and a knowledge of scientific methods. 
When formulated, all technical hy-
potheses, if possible, should be tested 
for validity and reliability. 
(2) The technical intelligence company 
must integrate the technical informa-
tion provided by all intelligence collec-
tion agencies in order to construct an 
objective assessment of enemy cap-
abilities. Technical intelligence is by 
nature a complex task requiring ex-
tensive coordination and collation by 
highly competent specialists capable 
of using their technical background, 
training, and expert opinions of tech-
nical reports in relation to available 
combat and strategic intelligence. Ex-
tensive integration must be performed 
by the field army intelligence staff in 
collating finished technical intelligence 
from other military intelligence bat-
talion elements prior to the final dis-
semination of technical intelligence. 
c. Deduction. Deduction is the last step in 
interpretation. This step consists of deriving 
meaning from the hypotheses that have been 
developed and tested. Deduction provides an-
swers as to the meaning of technical intelli-
gence and data in relation to the tactical situ-
ation and area of operation. 
Section II. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 
53. Considerations 
a. The producers of technical intelligence 
must constantly keep in mind that actual and 
potential enemy capabilities, limitations, and 
probable courses of action are being developed 
at the field army, theater, and national levels. 
Based upon the technical intelligence produced, 
new requirements for U.S. equipment are de-
veloped. Any pertinent intelligence that will 
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assist in the preparation of new U.S. military 
equipment and/or countermeasures must be 
considered by the technical intelligence pro-
ducer during the entire technical intelligence 
production cycle. For this reason, technical 
intelligence should be coordinated with all in-
telligence elements. 
b. Factors which must be regularly consid-
ered by technical intelligence producers include, 
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but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Effects of terrain and weather. 
(2) Characteristics, performance, and 
effectiveness of enemy equipment and 
materiel. 
(3) Countermeasures that are effective 
against enemy equipment. 
(4) New design features and modifications 
of old and/or new equipment. 
(5) Overall combat intelligence require-
ments. 
54. Technical-Military Reference Library 
a. Technical intelligence production, re-
search, analysis, and evaluation cannot be con-
ducted without a current data base. The need 
for specific data requirements, performance 
characteristics, equipment descriptions, oper-
ational limitations of materiel, and the exten-
sive need for integration and collation of techni-
cal information covering wide areas necessitate 
the provision of a technical intelligence refer-
ence library. This library will prove to be one 
of the most useful working tools for the tech-
nical intelligence company. As a minimum the 
technical library should include-
(1) Technical Bulletins. 
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by 
country). 
(3) Catalog of Foreign Material. 
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelli-
gence Registers. 
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data 
Handbooks. 
(6) Enemy tactics and operational con-
cept studies. 
(7) Technical equipment documents and 
studies. 
(8) Order of battle handbooks. 
(9) Enemy Tables of Organization and 
Equipment. 
(10) Appraisals of enemy equipment. 
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies. 
(12) Threat studies and assessments. 
b. Library technical publications not only 
provide accurate and timely technical informa-
tion and intelligence references, but in the 
interest of field army consumers they provide 
limited and selective technical intelligence sup-
port, thereby reducing the need for direct unit 
support. Library technical publications must be 
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oriented toward the needs of combat, combat 
support, and combat service support users and 
field army requirements. 
55. Use of Experts and/or Organizations 
a. The technical intelligence company will 
sometimes require assistance from military 
and/ or civilian personnel or organizations to 
assist in the technical analysis of materials to 
fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission. 
This may occur when the expertise needed to 
solve a highly technical and complex problem 
is not available within the technical intelligence 
company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date 
"Technical Expert File" (of names) will prove 
invaluable. When utilized, these "experts·' 
should work directly with the technical intelli-
gence company, and must possess the proper 
security clearance; they should be used as con-
sultants/ advisors for a short period of time. 
The most important criterion governing the use 
of these individuals is that such service should 
normally be voluntary. 
b. Military and/or civilian personnel whose 
training could be of special interest to technical 
intelligence units for analysis and production 
services include-
(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians. 
(2) Guided missile maintenance personnel. 
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists. 
(4) Guided missile and special weapons 
personnel. 
(5) Ammunition supply specialists. 
(6) Data processing personnel. 
(7) Electronic countermeasures personnel. 
(8) Cryptographic personnel. 
(9) Comm unica tion security analysts. 
( 10) Optical specialists. 
( 11) Explosive ordnance specialists. 
(12) Petroleum product analysts. 
(13) Guided missile propellant and explos-
ive specialists. 
(14) Geographers, geologists, and/or con-
struction specialists. 
(15) Photograph experts. 
(16) Communication specialists. 
( 17) W ea pons systems analysts. 
(18) Chemists, physicists, and biologists. 
( 19 ) Radar specialists. 
(20) Indigenous surgeons and medical spe-
cialists. 
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56. Photography 
a. Photographs are a valuable source of 
permanent information for technical analysis 
and evaluation. Frequently, technical intelli-
gence analysts supplement their finished re-
ports with photographs, diagrams, and charts. 
Equipment and materiel will often be captured 
or confiscated by fast-moving tactical units; 
photographs of this materiel can be sent to the 
rear by technical intelligence collection teams 
prior to the receipt of the actual equipment. 
In a fast moving tactical situation, the photo-
graph will be the only item available to the 
analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, 
destroyed, or recaptured. For this reason, tech-
nical intelligence collection teams at corps must 
be cognizant that one of their first specific acts 
should be to photograph in place all items of in-
telligence value from as many different angles 
as required. 
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, 
and compared, and must be accompanied by ap-
propriate written descriptions prior to further 
detailed evaluation and dissemination. The 
data available from a photograph may be high-
advantageous to the analyst; however, skill and 
training of the analyst are very important in 
exploitation of photographs. Photographs per-
mit a vast quantity of data base information to 
be rapidly analyzed, collated, and filed. Once 
photographs of equipment are taken, equipment 
should be rapidly evacuated. All photographs 
must contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring 
comparison to assist the analyst and other users 
of the information. 
c. Long range patrols, special forces oper-
ational detachments, and other intelligence col-
lection elements can provide photographs of 
special items of intelligence interest when oper-
ating behind enemy lines. However, their use 
must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon 
and they must be thoroughly briefed on tech-
nical intelligence requirements prior to dispatch 
on these missions. 
Section III. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
57. Classification 
Technical intelligence reports from the tech-
nical intelligence company are produced in ac-
cordance with appropriate army regulations in 
the 380-series. When equipment is acquired 
through a friendly foreign government, the spe-
cific security classification assigned by that 
government must be adhered to and given 
equivalent protection by being assigned to 
Group I in accordance with AR 380-6. Other-
wise, classified technical intelligence reports 
will be assigned to Group 3 as stated in AR 
380-6. (Paragraph 59 discusses the various 
types of reports.) 
58. Security Policies 
a. At times, technical intelligence involves 
sensitive security equipment/materiel and 
therefore will require stringent security con-
trols by the technical intelligence unit. A unit 
technical intelligence SOP covering security is 
mandatory in order to provide an adequate 
security framework to support operational re-
quirements. The technical intelligence SOP 
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must be precise, yet flexible, and should follow 
the following minimum guidelines: 
(1) Requirements for sensitive technical 
intelligence materiel in support of as-
signed missions must be carefully 
planned and should be revised period-
ically. 
(2) Information and materiel should be 
disseminated on a need-to-know basis 
in accordance with specific security 
regulations. 
(3) Care must be taken not to overclassify. 
b. At times, indigenous personnel may be 
required for a specific mission. Because of the 
sensitive nature of many areas of technical in-
telligence, information should be released only 
after: 
(1) An explicit need-to-know has been 
established. 
(2) Care has been taken to furnish only 
tho3e portions for which need-to-know 
has definitely been established. 
(3) The security requirements imposed by 
security regulations have been com-
plied with. 
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(4) It has been determined that released 
information is in the best interests of 
the United States. 
c. Special provisions must be prescribed by 
technical intelligence units for handling critical 
captured enemy equipment such as communica-
tion security equipment. This equipment must 
be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and 
designated "crypto," and tagged and evacuated 
to the nearest U.S. Army Security Agency 
(USASA) elements as soon as practicable. 
Some components of intelligence interest are as 
follows: 
(1) Speech security devices. 
(2) Teletype security devices. 
(3) Data security devices. 
(4) Off-line encryption devices. 
( 5) Key lists. 
( 6 ) Code books. 
(7) Documents, manuals, circuitry dia-
grams, and all ancillary equipment. 
Section IV. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 
59. Reports (see STANAG 2084 app IV) 
Six types of technical intelligence reports are 
generally used in the exploitation of captured 
materiel. These are-
a. Spot Report. This or written report is 
prepared by the capturing units and/or inter-
mediate command echelons to rapidly report by 
electrical or other means the acquisition of cap-
tured or abandoned foreign materiel through 
their next higher headquarters to the technical 
intelligence company. The basic items of this 
report should normally include as a minimum: 
(1) Who is reporting (unit)? 
(2) What is being reported? 
(3) Where and when (coordinates)? 
(4) How much materiel? 
(5) Whom to contact. 
(6) Condition of materiel. 
b. Preliminary Technical Report. This report 
is prepared and disseminated through intel-
ligence channels on all captured foreign mate-
riel. It is prepared by corps technical intel-
ligence collection teams or the capturing unit. 
The preliminary report places emphasis on 
alerting other tactical units to significant new 
tactical capabilities. It is prepared in the 
format as shown in Annex B of STANAG 2084. 
c. Complementary Technical Report. This 
report is prepared by technical intelligence col-
lection teams operating throughout a corps 
area in support of corps elements. It is a limited 
report for the use of the technical intelligence 
company and such other intelligence elements 
as the military intelligence battalion or field 
army G2 staff elements. It supplements infor-
mation in the PRETECHREP. 
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d. Detailed Technical Report. This report is 
the responsibility of the field army technical 
intelligence company and is prepared by 
various combat service support specialists in 
a coordinated effort. No format is specified be-
cause of the wide variety of materiel usually 
contained therein. 
e. Technical Document Report. This report 
is written on all captured enemy technical docu-
ments such as maintenance handbooks, opera-
tion manuals, drawings, and sketches. 
f. Special Technical Report. Special technical 
reports are prepared as required by field army 
G2 staff elements and higher echelons 
primarily as input to studies, plans, and con-
tingency planning requirements. These reports 
contain special information on items of signifi-
cant intelligence interest. No format is pre-
scribed for these reports, and content is gov-
erned by the nature of the technical intelligence 
desired. 
60. Combined Operations Reports 
Appendix V outlines current N A TO-
standardized nomenclature as prescribed by 
STANAG 2097. When possible, all technical 
intelligence report nomenclature should be 
N A TO-standardized and should be in conson-
ance with overall unified/joint/theater policies 
and guidance. The reports that can be used by 
technical intelligence elements in all combined 
operations are: 
a. Spot Report (SPOTREP). 
b. Preliminary Technical Report (PRE-
TECHREP). 
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c. Complementary Technical Report (COM-
TECHREP). 
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECH-
REP). 
e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC). 
61. Using Instructions 
Captured materiel which is later put into 
service and used by United States or Allied 
forces requires using instructions. Technical 
intelligence company personnel involved in de-
tailed analysis at F ASCOM are responsible for 
preparing and distributing using instructions. 
Such instructions, when· published, should 
always be a part of the final detailed report 
(DETECHREP) prepared by the company. 
Reports should always be annotated to indicate 
they are official field army technical intelligence 
reports. 
Section V. DISSEMINATION 
62. General 
The timely dissemination of technical intel-
ligence reports is of maximum importance to 
tactical, combat support, and combat service 
support commanders. The field army intel-
lig~nce staff uses technical intelligence reports 
as a basis for estimates, recommendations, and 
interpretation of information received. 
63. Methods Used 
a. The methods used to disseminate technical 
intelligence depends upon the detail and 
urgency of the intelligence and upon who the 
intended users are. Primary consideration 
must be given to the needs of the tactical users. 
The most common means of dissemination are: 
(1) Detailed technical reporfs (app IV, 
STANAG 2084). 
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins. 
(3) Technical reviews and summaries. 
(4) Special technical reports. 
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(5) Special technical studies and esti-
mates. 
(6) Handbooks. 
(7) Technical pamphlets. 
(8) Briefings. 
(9) Liaison visits. 
b. Before technical intelligence is transmitted 
to intelligence staffs for the normal processing 
and conversion into intelligence, the data must 
be-
(1) Screened for elimination of non-
essential information. 
(2) Translated into a nontechnical lan-
guage to permit general understand-
ing. 
(3) Interpreted, analyzed, and coordinated 
among all other combat service sup-
port specialists serving on functional 
technical intelligence teams. 
(4) Collated with other related intel-
ligence and data as appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 
Sedion I. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SUPPORT 
64. General 
a. Combat service support for technical intel-
ligence encompasses EOD, military police, and 
civil affairs support. 
b. Experience shows that about five to ten 
percent of ammunition employed will fail to 
function as originally intended. Compounding 
this problem are the use of missiles and 
delayed-action and influence-type fuzes on 
many types of ammunition and the introduc-
tion of "home made" explosive devices. The 
term "explosive ordnance" includes conven-
tional ammunition as well as chemical, bio-
logical and nuclear ammunition. 
c. Recovery and evacuation operations are 
often complicated by the presence of ammuni-
tion items in or on equipment. In addition, the 
possibility that abandoned items have been 
booby trapped must always be considered. It is 
necessary, therefore, that personnel engaged in 
recovery and evacuation operations be con-
stantly on the alert for such items. Extreme 
care must be taken to prevent explosions, fires, 
radiation burns, and accidental functioning. 
Accordingly, assistance of explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) personnel should be requested 
to provide explosive disposal support. The 
potential represented by modern chemical, bio-
logical, and nuclear ammunition has placed 
increased emphasis upon this requirement. 
65. Technical Intelligence Value 
a. Foreign ammunition encountered in the 
field may be of considerable intelligence value. 
There are many intelligence, research, and de-
velopment agencies in the Army and in other 
departments of the government that may ben-
efit from prompt information concerning new 
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items of foreign ammunition or the modifica-
tion of old. 
b. Information on foreign ammunition as-
sists in determining order of battle intelli-
gence; evaluating probable enemy courses of 
action, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and de-
veloping countermeasures. The markings on a 
bomb, missile, or shell; the materials used or 
substituted; or the mere fact that the item 
exists may be of great strategic value. Identi-
fication of the filler may establish requirements 
for special protective or retaliatory measures 
against conventional, nuclear, chemical, or bio-
logical attack. 
c. Knowledge of employment, effectiveness, 
and possible countermeasures are of immediate 
concern tactically. The type and caliber of 
enemy supporting weapons can be determined 
from captured enemy ammunition, duds, com-
ponents, and fragments. Sabotage devices being 
introduced by clandestine means can provide 
valuable indi~ators of probable enemy courses 
of action. 
d. Manufacturing methods and details of de-
sign may be of value to research and develop-
ment agencies of the Army. The development of 
effective EOD render-safe procedures and tools 
for first-seen enemy ammunition is of partic-
ular importance to the safety of EOD person-
nel and to the accomplishment of their mission. 
66. Information Desired 
Technical intelligence information desired on 
ammunition includes: 
a. New items of enemy ammunition, together 
with complete technical data on construction, 
markings, and functioning. 
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b. Design or change in design of known 
ammunition. 
c'. Changes in manufacturing techniques. 
d. Quality and type of material and/or ex-
plosive content. 
e. Packing, storing, and maintenance tech-
niques. 
/. Data concerning place and date of manu-
facture. 
g. Documents pertaining to the above, in-
cluding sources of information. 
67. EOD Team Operations 
The EOD unit commander is solely respon-
sible for determining the proper procedure to 
use in accomplishing the disposal operation for 
each project assigned to his team. Technical 
intelligence specialists provide technical advice 
to the team as required. Selection of the best 
method of disposal depends on a number of 
factors including the location, amount, and na-
ture of the explosive involved, proximity to 
structures and facilities; accessibility; condi-
tion; and personnel safety. Tasks to be per-
formed include-
a. Identification. All ammunition is first 
identified to determine the disposal procedure 
to be used. First-encountered foreign ammuni-
tion and markings must be photographed for 
technical intelligence and EOD purposes. Spe-
cial procedures required by technical intelli-
gence for photographing various types of mark-
ings are followed by EOD personnel. A written 
memorandum is prepared on the spot to include 
a concise description of the item, sketches, and 
details of location. 
b. Destruction in Place. Nondestructive 
render-safe procedures should be used on first-
seen foreign ordnance. If it cannot be rendered 
safe or removed, the item should be destroyed 
in place in such a manner as to minimize dam-
age. Samples of chemical or biological agent 
fillers are extracted from chemical or biological 
ammunition and preserved for laboratory anal-
ysis by technical intelligence personnel. 
c. Recovery. Unrecognized items and those 
for which search has been directed by higher 
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authority should be recovered whenever pos-
sible, even at the expense of considerable risk. 
Recovery of components and fragments of such 
items may be equally important. Such recovery 
is of value to technical intelligence and CONUS-
based DA research elements in the development 
of disposal methods and tools. The following 
minimum guidelines apply: 
(1) New or unknown types of foreign am-
munition recovered by EOD person-
nel must be turned over to technical 
intelligence units for disposition. Se-
curity classification of the items and 
their components will not be lower 
than SECRET. 
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or com-
ponents, to include sabotage devices, 
are evacuated through technical in-
telligence channels. Security classifi-
cation of such items will not be lower 
than SECRET RESTRICTED DATA. 
(3) In addition to security escorts, tech-
nical escorts are required to provide 
safety control for shipments of nu-
clear, chemical, biological, and other 
hazardous items of ammunition. With-
in the field army, technical intelli-
gence personnel will coordinate with 
appropriate staff officers to determine 
the need and arrange for technical 
escorts. For shipment of such ammu-
nition to CONUS, the theater intelli-
gence officer determines the need and 
arranges for technical escorts. 
(4) Collection of technical intelligence 
data will, in many instances, entail 
dismantling the ammunition and strip-
ping fuzes and other dangerous com-
ponents for analysis and evaluation. 
These operations should be conducted 
only by experienced EOD personnel. 
In many cases, complete dismantling 
and stripping may be beyond the capa-
bility of small units in the field. Unless 
the urgency requires the acceptance of 
a high degree of risk, the item is evac-
uated. Dismantling and stripping is 
conducted only in response to a valid 
requirement placed through technical 
intelligence or EOD staffs. 
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(5) Captured mines and booby traps 
should be analyzed and/or tested only 
by trained weapons/munitions spe-
cialists who are thoroughly familiar 
with their construction, techniques, 
and use. Extreme caution must be 
exercised when such things as taut 
wires and pull releases are encoun-
tered, since any explosive item can 
be used as a booby trap. Unusual 
mechanisms used as booby traps 
should be immediately reported to 
the technical intelligence company 
through use of the spot report. Any 
countermeasures must be coordinated 
with explosive ordnance demolition 
personnel. Final disposal of explosive 
components or hazardous materials 
associated with such devices and with 
recovered ammunition is the respon-
sibility of EOD personnel. 
68. Reports 
All information gathered by EOD personnel 
on first-seen foreign ammunition must be re-
ported immediately through EOD control cen-
ters to EOD staff officers. At staff level, such 
reports will be placed in intelligence channels in 
accordance with intelligence regulations. Two 
types of EOD reports are required in the field: 
preliminary technical reports and complemen-
tary technical reports. 
a. Preliminary Technical Repo'rts (PRE-
TECHREP). These reports are prepared by 
EOD personnel upon recognition of the ammu-
nition as an item of technical intelligence value. 
The reports are used to alert technical intelli-
gence teams so that they may be dispatched 
to the site. In addition to the information pre-
scribed in Annex B, STANAG 2084, a recom-
mended tentative render-safe procedure should 
be indicated by the EOD unit commander. 
b. Complementary Technical Reports (COM-
TECHREP). These reports are prepared by 
technical intelligence teams as prescribed in 
Annex D, STANAG No. 2084. In the absence 
of technical intelligence personnel, the report 
will be prepared by the EOD unit. This report 
contains complete and detailed information not 
found in the PRETECHREP. It will be sub-
mitted by the fa*st available means to the 
technical intelligence company. 
69. Dissemination 
Technical intelligence on ammunition and 
missile warheads may be disseminated from 
any level. Information in reports being trans-
mitted to higher echelons, or received from 
other sources, which may be of value to dis-
posal personnel of a lower command should be 
extracted and published at once. The Foreign 
Science and Technology Center, U. S. Army 
Materiel Command, makes available foreign 
ammunition items, reports, and evaluations re-
quired for study and use in the development 
of EOD tools and render-safe procedures. The 
need for the strictest secrecy in explosive ord-
nance render-safe procedures is extremely im-
portant in order that the enemy does not learn 
when effective measures for disarming his 
ammunition have been developed. 
Section II. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT 
70. General 
Military police can often contribute signifi-
cantly to the command's technical intelligence 
effort. Military police characteristically per-
form duties on an area-wide basis; they are 
trained observers; and their close association 
with numerous law enforcement and other civil-
ian agencies during the course of normal duties 
can be effectively utilized in certain aspects 
of the development of technical intelligence. 
This effort should not, however, be exploited 
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to the detriment of their primary duties of pro-
viding police or investigative services to the 
command. 
71. Collection 
As collection agencies, military police units 
and personnel, particularly criminal investiga-
tors, are well suited to assist in such functions 
as: 
a. Collecting and reporting items of foreign 
material on the "Items Wanted List." 
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b. Locating specific technical items of equip-
ment. 
c. Locating personalities and activities with-
in a specialized technical field. 
d. Reporting items of potential technical in-
telligence value determined from prisoner of 
war (PW) and civilian internee sources. 
e. Reporting items of potential value confis-
cated or captured in raids. 
72. Security and Escort 
Items of materiel captured or received by 
U. S. military forces and determined to be 
of technical intelligence value will often require 
safeguarding not only during storage but also 
during evacuation. Military police normally 
provide physical security at storage depots and 
during movement to the rear when the materiel 
is determined to be "sensitive." Military police 
escorts are provided for safeguarding classified 
information. 
73. Using Agency 
a. Military police have a continuing interest 
in technological changes and developments of 
foreign nations in the following general cate-
gories for possible adaptations to U. S. military 
police use: 
(1) Physical security devices, including 
protective alarms and all types of in-
trusion-detection devices. 
(2) Traffic control devices, including elec-
tronic speed and surveillance devices. 
(3) Police and investigative equipment, 
such as identification systems and 
photography. 
(4) Automation of police records on offen-
ders, criminal.;:;, and prisoners; and on 
traffic, and law enforcement files and 
systems. 
(5) Riot control munitions, devices, and 
techniques. 
(6) Industrial defense equipment and 
techniques. 
(7) Booby traps. 
b. The senior military police representative 
at each command closely coordinates with the 
technical intelligence staff officers of the appro-
priate headquarters to insure that items in the 
above-listed categories are included on the 
"Items Wanted List" and that potentially usa-
ble technical information is mutually ex-
changed. 
74. Materiel Obtained by Military Police 
The different items of foreign materiel sub-
ject to confiscation from prisoners of war in-
clude arms; ammunition; military equipment 
(except mess equipment, metal helmets, and 
protective masks); military documents, such 
as military codes and ciphers; pictures and 
maps or sketches of military installations or 
implements of war; and signal devices. All 
other property taken from prisoners is grouped 
in the category of retained or impounded prop-
erty and must be accounted for or Ultimately 
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces 
assume custody. 
75. Marking of PW Materiel 
a. Procedures for marking foreign materiel 
of potential technical intelligence value that is 
taken from PW should include means of posi-
tively identifying the materiel with the PW. 
This is necessary because prisoners and mate-
riel will often by evacuated through separate 
channels, and accurate identification of the PW 
will facilitate future location. This would also 
facilitate the identification of certain property 
which must eventually be returned to the PW 
by regulations. (STANAG 2084, app IV.) 
b. Capturing troops are authorized to obtain 
nothing more than the name, rank, and service 
number of the prisoner. Military police detach-
ments assigned to the lowest level of command 
should, therefore, provide as much as possible 
for a positive means of identification such as 
a photograph or fingerprints of the PW to be 
affixed to the materiel tag. 
Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT 
76. General 
The nature of civil affairs operations re-
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quires its personnel to develop and maintain 
close relationship with the civilian population. 
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As previously stated, this puts civil affairs per-
sonnel in a favorable position to collect intelli-
gence information as well as to obtain foreign 
materiel! equipment and technical information 
which may be of significant value to the tech-
nical intelligence effort of the command. 
77. Collection Potential 
Civil affairs personnel, in the conduct of their 
day-to-day operations, may encounter persons 
with potentially valuable technical knowledge, 
materiel/ equipment, and technical documents. 
These persons may be sources of technical 
intelligence and may include-
(1.. Civilian technicians among refugees, 
evacuees, and displaced persons. 
b. Military personnel with technical back-
grounds impersonating civilians. 
c. Civilian technicians and scientists associ-
ated with the hostile government or forces. 
d. Governmental technical_ documents, spe-
cialized libraries, and archives. 
e. Industrial and scientific records. 
f. Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or 
other information pertaining to technical intel-
ligence in the mobility, communications-elec-
tronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, and 
medical fields. 
78. Procurement and Identification 
a. Direct support to technical intelligence 
units may be provided by civil affairs units in 
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the possible procurement of technical materiel! 
equipment, identification of technical person-
nel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian tech-
nicians or scientists. 
b. Aside from the normal procurement of 
civilian real property, civil affairs personnel 
may procure-
(1) Civilian equipment such as recording 
devices, radios, weapons, or other 
items which may be found as personal 
possessions. 
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other 
medical supplies. 
(3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction 
equipment, and materials. 
(4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propel-
lants. 
c. Through contacts with civil organizations, 
leaders, political enemies of the hostile regime, 
and various other segments of the population, 
civil affairs personnel can provide valuable as-
sistance in the identification of individuals hav-
ing technical knowledge such as-
(1) Civilian technicians-engineers, arch-
itects, chemists, and physicists. 
(2) Professional personnel-doctors, sur-
geons, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and 
university professors. 
(3) Skilled craftsmen/laborers-mechan-
ics, gunsmiths, electricians, drafts-
men, and allied personnel engaged in 
the production of weapons, vehicles, 
missiles, tracked vehicles, aircraft, 
and other equipment. 
AGO 5590A 
CHAPTER 8 
INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS 
Section I. GENERAL 
79. Characteristics 
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and 
priorities in internal defense development as-
sistance operations will differ from those in 
limited and general conflict. While some pro-
cedures may vary, the principles of technical 
intelligence remain unchanged. However, addi-
tional considerations will be necessary in 
applying these principles. Military units, for 
example, may be dispersed for independent! 
decentralized operations. Movement of techni-
cal intelligence personnel must be by the fastest 
means available. Likewise, evacuation of enemy 
equipment and materiel must be performed by 
the most secure means available, usually by air, 
to prevent recapture or loss. The technical 
sophistication of the insurgent's equipment and 
materiel normally is not as extensive as that of 
a conventional enemy. Enemy materiel con-
sists priniarily of small arms, automatic weap-
ons, and mortars obtained from friendly, 
neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is 
often augmented by primitive but nevertheless 
effective weapons such as crossbows, man-
traps, sharpened stakes, and the like. 
b. Technical intelligence specialists must be 
thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, 
capabilities, and performance of the small 
arms and weapons from a variety of friendly 
and non-friendly nations. The insurgent usual-
ly has a limited capability to perform modifica-
tions to weapons and materiel. If these modifi-
cations are not carefully analyzed and evalu-
ated, their significance and the conclusions 
drawn can be misleading. Often, technical 
intelligence derived during internal defense 
operations has serious national and political 
consequences; it must therefore be accurate. 
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c. Arms caches and weapons-smuggling are 
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms 
caches can be of major significance politically 
and tactically. Arms caches and logistical stores 
should be carefully analyzed and evaluated for 
technical intelligence usually in a combined 
effort with the host country. The discovery of 
arms caches, when carefully exploited by func-
tionally integrated technical teams, can lead to 
valuable intelligence about the overall insurg-
ent tactical situation. Normally, all captured 
equipment and materiel becomes the property 
of the host country, and for this reason com-
bined operations, liaison, and coordination are 
important to insure full exploitation. The dis-
position of foreign materiel may be governed 
by status of forces or other agreements, thus 
complicating the collection and analysis prob-
lems. Close coordination by technical intelli-
gence personnel with tactical units, civil affairs 
units, and all U.S. government departments 
and agencies engaged in collection is important. 
Combined (U.S.-Host Country) technical in-
telligence operations are a particularly effec-
tive means of improving collection capability 
by using the language and area knowledge of 
native military personnel. 
d. The scope of insurgent warfare can en-
compass the elite and professionally trained 
military forces as well as local guerrillas or 
part-time fighters and noncombatants. How-
ever, substantial differences exist in armament, 
organization, training, equipment, and overall 
effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors 
and analysts must be cognizant of these differ-
ences in all analyses. Familiarity will insurg-
ent tactics, doctrine, and organization will 
greatly enhance the technical analysis and 
evaluation capabilities of the technical intelli-
gence unit. 
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80. Cold War Operations 
a. In cold war operations, prior to initial 
deployment of combat forces, the early detec-
tion and identification of equipment and mate-
riel used by hostile forces assume paramount 
importance. The establishment of identities 
of outside logistical sources of supply is imper-
ative and assists in the determination of diplo-
matic action, overall strategy, force structure, 
and military equipment which should be de-
ployed for successful mission accomplishment. 
b. Should Military Attaches, Military Assist-
ance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions be 
present in a foreign country experiencing in-
surgency, their capabilities and background 
information data can be used to supplement the 
initial technical intelligence data base in order 
to begin technical intelligence collection and 
analysis. 
Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES 
81. Technical Intelligence Emphasis 
During internal defense operations, technical 
intelligence personnel perform normal duties as 
described for conventional operations; however, 
particular emphasis must be placed on the 
following: 
a. Training host country combat personnel, 
as necessary, in technical intelligence collection 
and evacuation procedures. 
b. Coordinating technical intelligence mat-
ters with other services having a technical in-
telligence interest and with the host country. 
c. Assisting in the organization and develop-
ment of a host country technical intelligence 
capability if required. 
d. Performing more on-the-spot technical in-
telligence analysis and evaluation of enemy 
equipment and materiel. 
e. Providing technical advice and assistance 
to host country military technical intelligence 
personnel as required. 
f. Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques 
of insurgents for use by US forces as feasible. 
82. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor 
a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role 
in technical intelligence collection by coordinat-
ing host country requests for technical intelli-
gence support, providing technical intelligence 
advice, and informing US intelligence staffs 
when significant discoveries of insurgent equip-
ment, materiel, or arms caches are acquired. 
Technical intelligence collection/analyst per-
sonnel must keep the unit intelligence advisor 
informed of important guerrilla weaponry de-
velopments in addition to helping him maintain 
a technical intelligence "Item-Wanted List." 
b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is re-
sponsible for advising and training host coun-
try forces in all aspects of intelligence, to in-
clude technical intelligence, a mutual flow of 
technical information between the advisor and 
advisee is mandatory. Mutually defined goals 
and objectives between an advisor and advisee 
are essential. 
83. Combat Service Support Role 
If an insurgency progresses into a war of 
movement, technical intelligence becomes im-
portant to the success of combat intelligence. 
Combat service support staffs expand their 
participation in the technical intelligence pro-
duction effort through advice at all command 
echelons. All technical intelligence must be 
processed through intelligence G2/S2 staff ele-
ments; however, close coordination with techni-
cal service staffs during the interpretation and 
evaluation phase is mandatory. The establish-
ment of a combined US and host country tech-
nical intelligence center may become advisable. 
Section III. PROCEDURES 
84. Analysis 
a. Technical intelligence collection and analy-
sis becomes more complicated in internal de-
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fense operations since the combined political or 
military objective often is more than merely 
seizing and holding terrain. Information of the 
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technical characteristics of insurgent weapons 
must be continuously updated and expanded as 
the weapons appear. Otherwise, the tactics 
and efforts needed to isolate the insurgent can-
not be adequately determined. When a blockade 
is used to stop the flow of arms and ammunition 
to the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts 
must be particularly thorough in collection, 
analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply 
shortages and small changes in the chemical 
composition of propellants and demolitions or 
shortages might be indicators of the potential 
effectiveness of a blockade. 
b. It is imperative for political/military pur-
poses that technical intelligence personnel keep 
abreast of outside military assistance furnished 
such as modern anti-aircraft missiles, guns, 
propellants, and petroleum products. For ex-
ample, analysis of new missile propellants can 
give vital indications of enemy tactical capa-
bilities. 
85. Investigative Data 
a. The technical intelligence collection teams 
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and 
ammunition cache investigations and make re-
ports thereon. Thousands of caches, depots, 
salvage points, and small factories may be dis-
covered over a period of time and need to be 
fully exploited. Most of the weapons and am-
munition will be a mixture of those from other 
nations to include our own. Statistical data 
must be maintained on weapons, ammunition, 
and supplies that have been captured by our 
forces. Technical intelligence plays an impor-
tant role in the maintenance of such data and 
in determining its overall significance. 
b. The discovery of arms caches may occur 
frequently and may completely tie up technical 
intelligence specialists. At times, on-the-spot 
analyses may have to be performed by func-
tional teams. One of the most important prob-
lems facing technical intelligence specialists 
will be the planning for exploitation of these 
arms caches. Priorities must be established 
with primary consideration given to tactical 
needs. The entire analysis effort can be mate-
rially assisted by proper troop orientation in 
all aspects of technical intelligence, close co-
ordination with major tactical headquarters, 
and placement of proper emphasis on the 
"Items-Wanted List." 
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c. Technical characteristics of a newly en-
countered enemy weapon or item of equipment, 
in addition to providing valuable combat intelli-
gence, can, when scientifically analyzed, be used 
in strategic intelligence and as an aid in deter-
mining enemy technical, industrial, and manu-
facturing capabilities. In addition, it is possible 
by analysis of the marking of cartridge cases 
to determine the plant and country where the 
cartridge was manufactured. 
d. In th~ event of capture of a large number 
of like items of equipment or materiel, the tech-
nical intelligence collection teams must examine 
the materiel and obtain all available informa-
tion relative to lot numbers, date of manufac-
ture, and factory markings that may assist in 
providing information on the item. A sufficient 
number of items must be transmitted through 
technical intelligence channels to properly 
evaluate the item. The remaining items are 
then processed through normal evacuation and/ 
or salvage supply channels for use as needed by 
friendly forces. 
e. Information on the use of "primitive 
weapons" such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, 
and deadfalls must be widely disseminated to-
gether with appropriate instructions on 
countermeasures. 
f. The technical intelligence personnel of the 
field collection teams coordinate operations with 
explosive ordnance disposal teams if dud rounds 
of any type are suspected. 
86. Logistical System 
Although the logistical system of the insur-
gent may be rudimentary and primitive, the 
technical intelligence analysts may be required 
to deal with a variety of commodity items for 
intelligence purposes (e.g., ealt rations, agricul-
tural products, primitive drugs, and serums). 
The capability of the insurgent's logistical sys-
tem to support sustained military operations 
may well be determined through technical anal-
ysis of commodity items. 
87. Combined Operations 
a. A major problem of technical intelligence 
is the acquisition of the necessary language 
skills and experiences to perform technical 
analysis and evaluation of technical equipment 
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in a foreign country. Therefore, combined 
operations with the host country forces are 
usually imperative. Host country military per-
sonnel who possess some limited technical train-
ing are utilized to assist in analyses. Close 
supervision is necessary. With additional train-
ing, such personnel can assist in overcoming 
language and operational problems. Also, civil 
affairs units, if available, may assist in the 
acquisition of necessary linguistic personnel. 
b. Indigenous technical intelligence person-
nel who are thoroughly familiar with the cul-
ture and environment of the insurgent are an 
asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation 
of certain types of technical data and informa-
tion. For example, the living habits of guer-
rillas living in underground tunnels can be use-
ful in evaluating and updating important 
technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, 
and stored materiel may be indicators which 
lead to valuable intelligence. 
88. Search and Destroy Operation 
a. An important characteristic of internal 
defense operations is the extensive use of 
"search and destroy" tactical operations which 
do not emphasize holding terrain. In addition 
to the potential loss of valuable intelligence, 
these operations present a formidable problem 
for the technical intelligence collection teams 
and analysts. Technical intelligence collection 
teams coordinating with tactical units must 
emphasize that such operations should attempt 
to avoid the destruction of potentially valuable 
technical equipment/materiel and facilities. 
Therefore, technical intelligence personnel must 
brief tactical elements on current "Items-
Wanted Lists" and other items of significant 
intelligence interest. In this manner, sound de-
cisions can be made by tactical commanders 
and staff officers in avoiding the destruction of 
potentially valuable intelligence. Proper plan-
ning, implementation, and dissemination of the 
operations order can minimize the loss of poten-
tial intelligence. 
b. Tunnels and excavations are frequently 
used by the insurgent in order to provide pro-
tection to personnel and supplies. When these 
are discovered, they must be destroyed. How-
ever, tunnels and excavations may contain a 
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wide variety of potential intelligence informa-
tion that should be collected prior to their 
destruction. Time permitting, the following 
checklist should be used by tactical units in 
submitting information reports on the destruc-
tion of all such facilities-
(1) Location (coordinates). 
(2) Evaluation of construction. 
(3) Specialized underground areas (class-
room, training). 
(4) Installation of internal communica-
tion facilities. 
(a) Internal to internal. 
( b) Internal to external. 
(c) Use of special antennas. 
(5) Power available. 
(6) Alternate/emergency power system. 
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather 
on). 
(8) Assessment of construction of in-
ternal operational facilities (shops, 
tool-making, repairs). 
(9) General assessment of health facil-
ities. 
(a) Waste disposal. 
(b) Water facilities. 
(c) Contamination. 
(d) Care of sick and wounded. 
( e) Assessment medical standards. 
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if 
applicable) . 
(11) Measures taken against severe 
weather. 
(12) Assessment of political propaganda 
indoctrination (documents, news-
posters, magazines, printing presses). 
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental 
resources. 
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial re-
sources (lumber, cotton). 
(15) Special items of interest. 
(16) Recreation facilities. 
(17) Assessment of defensive areas. 
(18) Internal security or warning devices. 
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelli-
gence related activities. 
(20) New field expedients (of major and 
constant interest). 
89. Booby traps and Mines 
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used 
widely by the insurgent. Frequently mines, 
booby traps, and emplaced munitions are used 
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for harassment of military operations; there-
fore, it is imperative that technical intelligence 
specialists keep abreast of these munition devel-
opments. The employment of explosive ord-
nance materiel must be analyzed on a continual 
basis. For example, duds can easily be modified 
and used as booby traps. 
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in 
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide 
the following principal information when such 
weapons and tactics are used. 
(1) Fragmentation radii. 
(2) Modifications made to booby traps and 
mines. 
(3) Construction of locally manufactured 
mines. 
(4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, 
pull, chemical). 
(5) Types of explosives (bomb, grenade, 
artillery, mortar). 
(6) Fuze ingredients and structures. 
(7) Modifications to mortar and artillery 
fuzes. 
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or 
materiel. 
(9) Foreign manufactured items used III 
mines and booby traps. 
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or 
blasting machines). 
(11) Use of chemical devices. 
(12) Use of large bombs. 
c. Dissemination of technical intelligence 
concerning booby traps and mines should be 
made together with countermeasure training 
data. 
90. Civilian Technicians 
During internal defense operations, it is pos-
sible that civilians having technical knowledge 
will come under civil affairs control upon lib-
eration of an area from insurgent control. 
Their evacuation for interrogation purposes 
may not be desirable because of the attitude 
of the civil population at the time. However, 
the civil population will in all probability be 
screened by U.S. or host country civil affairs 
units or police elements. When civilians having 
technical skills are identified and they can con-
tribute potential technical intelligence informa-
tion, they should be referred to technical intelli-
gence elements. 
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91. Propaganda Equipment 
a. Psychological operations are widely used 
in an insurgency and in a limited and general 
war environment. The discovery of insurgent 
propaganda equipment requires analysis by a 
functional team consisting of supply, chemical, 
and equipment personnel to analyze the print-
ing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being 
used. Such analysis is necessary to assess 
guerrilla methods and determine sources of 
supply. Communications-electronics specialists 
can assist psychological operations personnel in 
the analysis of loudspeakers and radio broad-
casting equipment. 
b. The technical intelligence aspects of oper-
able foreign radio and television stations and 
printing facilities are important in furthering 
the field army psychological operations capa-
bility. Such installations and facilities should 
be turned over to civil affairs and psychological 
operations units for maximum exploitation. 
c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities 
can be used to further enhance the overall tech-
nical intelligence effort. Specific items of equip-
ment desired can be advertised, offering a 
monetary reward to potential defectees. How-
ever, such a program must be strictly controlled 
and be approved at the highest echelon. 
92. Long Range Patrols 
a. The long range patrol (LRP) company 
has a limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate 
small portable items of enemy equipment or 
materiel, and can be used under exceptional cir-
cumstances. However, it must be emphasized 
that such missions should not interfere with 
primary patrol missions. The requirements for 
the long range patrol requires coordination and 
approval at higher headquarters. 
b. The long range patrol (LRP) companies 
of the corps or their equivalent command struc-
ture will have an extensive need for technical 
intelligence. Frequently, special technical re-
ports and data will have to be furnished for 
special missions. The nature of LRP mission 
may necessitate observation, identification, and 
reporting of enemy equipment and materiel 
over periods of 3 to 5 days. Such special mis-
sions require the most current technical infor-
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mation and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRP 
on certain special missions, technical intelli-
gence personnel may be requested to provide a 
general technical briefing on equipment and 
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materiel to the patrol to contribute to mission 
success by accurately identifying enemy equip-
ment and materiel which may be observed or 
used by the enemy to detect such patrols. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE STRATEGIC EFFORT 
93. General 
a. The overall military technical intelligence 
effort plays a vital role in the U.S. strategic/ 
national, scientific, and technical intelligence 
effort. Equi!)ment, materie1, data, and infor-
mation are provided on a continual basis to the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which acts 
as the central military technical intelligence 
coordinating office, and eventually to CONUS-
producing units where long-range technical! 
scientific intelligence and equipment are devel-
oped. Army technical intelligence support is 
provided as close to the area of collection as 
possible in order to accomplish this mission 
(fig. 6). 
b. The objectives of the strategic technical 
intelligence effort are to-
(1) Determine capabilities, limitations, 
and vulnerabilities of foreign tech-
nology, materiel, facilities, and instal-
lations. 
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the 
benefit of the US forces. 
(3) Assist in the development of effective 
countermeasures by providing intelli-
gence to the overall military research 
and development effort. 
(4) Provide materiel and information 
upon which to base the training of all 
armed forces personnel. 
c. The principal producers of foreign intelli-
gence within the Department of Defense are-
(1) Assistant Director for Scientific and 
Technical Intelligence of DIA 
(DIAST). 
(2) Foreign Science and Technology Cen-
ter (FSTC). 
(3) Missile Intelligence Directorate 
(MID). 
(4) Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
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Center (STIC) of the Department of 
the Navy. 
(5) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) 
of the Air Force. 
94. Role of DA Agencies 
The Army Materiel Command, through its 
subordinate agency known as the Foreign Sci-
ence and Technology Center (FSTC), is re-
sponsible for providing U.S. strategic planners, 
the military research and development effort, 
and the military technical/scientific effort with 
timely and appropriate technical intelligence. 
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
(ACSI), Department of the Army, has general 
staff responsibility for all scientific and techni-
cal intelligence activities in the Army. Specific-
ally, ACSI, DA, performs the following: 
a. Formulates policies and procedures which 
insure that scientific and technical intelligence 
activities are carried out in the most efficient 
and productive manner. 
b. Supervises the preparation and execution 
of the Army scientific and technical intelligence 
program, in coordination with the Defense In-
telligence Agency (DIA), and provides for its 
integration into the Department of Defense 
(DOD) Consolidated Intelligence Program 
(CIP). 
c. Coordinates requirements for technical 
intelligence originated by the Department of 
the Army staff and major subordinate com-
mands to insure that they are fulfilled. 
95. Strategic Procedures 
a. A requirement for technical intelligence 
can be levied by any agency within DOD. Fre-
quently, however, a research and development 
(R&D) activity or major CONUS command 
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Note 
A modified version is 
included in Change 1, 
which is included at the 
end of this document. 
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levies this requirement upon military intelli-
gence resources. 
b. Requirements are prepared by the Army 
consumer using appropriate DA Forms for 
Intelligence Production Requirements (IPR) 
which are forwarded to ACSI, DA, for review. 
The requirements are then forwarded to DIA 
for final validation and are levied upon the ap-
propriate oversea theater command. As re-
quirements are satisfied, the information and/ 
or materiel are forwarded direct, or through 
major oversea command channels, to CONUS. 
Unless specific instructions to the contrary 
are given by a Department of the Army agency, 
all items for CONUS exploitation must be for-
warded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence 
Office (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland, in accordance with provisions of the 
theater command. This office makes the deci-
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sion as to the CONUS site of full exploitation 
to include the detailed plan concerning security 
and disposition. 
96. Strategic Dissemination 
When the final technical intelligence reports 
are produced, they are disseminated to various 
consumers in accordance with previously re-
quested statements of intelligence interest 
(SII). . A continual feedback ~f information 
from oversea producers to DIA and from DIA 
and CONUS-producing units to the oversea 
maj or commands is necessary if the entire 
technical intelligence cycle is to be effective. 
The distribution of technical information from 
CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the 
oversea command to insure that military in-
telligence units are kept abreast of important 
enemy technical and scientific trends and de-
velopments. 
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AR 75-15 
AR 320-5 
AR 320-50 
AR 350-25 
AR 380-series 
AR 551-50 
AR 755-14 
FM 3-10 
FM 3-10A 
FM 3-10B 
FM 5-30 
FM 9-6 
FM 9-30 
FM 11-30 
FM 17-1 
FM 19-40 
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APPENDIX I 
REFERENCES 
----
Responsibilities and pro-
cedures for Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal. 
Dictionary of United 
States Army Terms. 
Authorized Abbrevi-
ations and Brevity 
Codes. 
Civil Affairs Training. 
Military Security. 
Training of Foreign Per-
sonnel by the United 
States Army. 
Responsibilities for 
Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal. 
Employment of Chemical 
and Biological Agents. 
Employment of Biologi-
cal Agents. 
Employment of Chemical 
Agents. 
Engineer Intelligence. 
Ammunition Service in 
the Theater of Oper-
ations. 
Maintenance Battalion: 
Division Support 
Command. 
Signal Corps Technical 
Intelligence. 
Armor Operations. 
Enemy Prisoners of War 
and Civilian Internees. 
FM 21-5 
FM 21-6 
FM 27-10 
FM 29-22 
FM 30-series 
FM 30-5 
FM 30-15 
FM 31-16 
FM 32-5 (CM) 
FM 33-5 
FM 41-5 
FM 41-10 
FM 55-8 
FM 100-5 
FM 100-10 
FM 100-20 (C) 
FM 101-5 
Military Training. 
Techniques of Military 
Instruction. 
The Law of Land War-
fare. 
Maintenance Operations 
in the Field Army. 
Military Intelligence. 
Combat Intelligence. 
Intelligence 
Interrogations. 
Counterguerrilla 
Operations. 
Communications 
Security (U). 
Psychological 
Operations. 
Joint Manual of Civil 
Affairs/Military 
Government. 
Civil Affairs Operations. 
Transportation 
Intelligence. 
Field Service Regulations 
-Operations. 
Combat Service Support. 
Field Service Regulations 
-Counterinsurgency 
(U). 
Staff Officer's Field Man-
ual; Staff Organization 
and Procedure. 
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FM 101-31-1 Staff Officer's Field Man- DA Pam 310-4 Index of Technical Man-
ual; Nuclear Weapons uals, Technical 
Employment. Regulations, Technical 
JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of United Bulletins, Supply Bulletins, Lubrication States Military Terms Orders, and Modifica-for Joint Usage. tion Work Orders. 
JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed TOE 3-500E Chemical Service Organ-
Forces (UNAAF). ization. 
DA Pam 27-1 Treaties Governing Land TOE 30-series Military Intelligence. 
Warfare. 
NATO Standardization Agreements 
DA Pam 27-161-2 International Law. STANAG 2084 and 2097. 
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APPENDIX II 
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Major categories of technical intelligence 
interest used for planning purposes-
52 
(1) Science and Technology. 
(a) Medical sciences. 
(b) Physical sciences. 
(c) Chemical sciences. 
(d) Research and development. 
(e) Materials. 
(I) Military equipment production. 
(g) Missiles and rockets. 
(2) Nuclear. 
(a) Nuclear materials. 
(b) Weapons and munitions. 
( c) Nuclear reactors. 
(d) Nuclear power systems. 
(e) Nuclear propulsion. 
(3) Electronics. 
(a) Radar. 
(b) Computers. 
(c) Communications. 
(d) Reconnaissance and surveillance 
equipment. 
(e) Electronic countermeasures. 
(I) Laser. 
(g) Telemetry. 
(h) Other. 
(4) CB. 
(a) CB agents. 
(b) Weapons and munitions. 
(c) CB defensive equipment. 
(5) Ground Systems. 
(a) Combat vehicles (wheeled and 
track). 
(b) Support/logistical vehicles. 
(c) Artillery. 
(d) Air defense equipment. 
(e) Infantry weapons. 
(f) Ammunition, munitions, fuzes. 
(g) Antitank equipment. 
(h) Individual equipment and/or sup-
plies. 
(i) Special warfare weapons. 
(j) Maintenance equipment. 
(k) Amphibious equipment. 
(l) Camouflage equipment. 
(m) Wire support equipment. 
(n) Airborne equipment. 
(0) Target acquisition equipment. 
(6) Aerodynamic Systems. 
(a) Bombers. 
(b) Fighters, 
(c) Drones. 
(d) Helicopters. 
(e) Reconnaissance aircraft. 
(I) Other. 
(7) Missiles. 
(a) Aircraft-launched missiles. 
(b) Ground-to-ground missiles. 
1. Short-range missiles. 
2. Intermediate range missiles. 
3. Long-range missiles. 
( c ) Air defense missiles. 
(d) Anti-tank missiles. 
(e) Anti-missile missiles. 
(I) Space systems. 
(g) Submarine/ship-launched missiles. 
(8) Sensor Equipment 
(a) Optical. 
( b) Acoustic. 
(c) Radint. 
(d) Photographic. 
(e) EIint. 
(f) Telemetry (measuring devices) 
laser. 
(g) Other. 
(9) Information Storage and Retrieval. 
(a) Electronic data processing equip-
ment. 
(b) Document processing equipment. 
(c) Manual equipment. 
(d) Machine translation equipment. 
(e) Real-time ADP equipment. 
(I) Telemetry support equipment. 
(g) Graphic display equipment. 
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APPENDIX III 
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN 
Copy No. 
Thirtieth Army 
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany 
100930 July 10-
Appendix ______ to Annex ______ (Intelligence) to Operation Order. 
1. General 
a. References. 
b. Purpose and scope. 
c. Period covered. 
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans. 
e. Priorities. 
2. Organization 
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon). 
(1) Organization. 
(2) Functions. 
(3) Subordinate agencies functions. 
(4) Supporting agencies. 
(5) Liaison and coordination. 
b. A subparagraph for each combat service support technical 
intelligence section as it relates to paragraph 2c. 
(1) Weapons-munitions. 
(2) Communication-electronics. 
(3) Supply and equipment. 
(4) Chemical. 
(5) Mobility. 
(6) Medical. 
c. Each combat service support element should know the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Mission. 
(2) General organization. 
(3) Functional team structure. 
(4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel. 
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities. 
(6) Location of collection points at each echelon. 
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53 
54 
CLASSIFICATION 
(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the 
theater. 
3. Personnel 
a. Military policies concerning: 
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit. 
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel. 
(3) Handling abandoned equipment. 
(4) Handling technical facilities and installations. 
(5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when 
necessary. 
(6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units. 
(7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in for-
ward areas. 
(8) Preliminary examinations and analysis. 
(9) Reports to be rendered. 
(a) To tactical units. 
(b) To technical intelligence company. 
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence per-
sonnel. 
(11) Equipment evacuation. 
(12) Markings and tags. 
h. Civilian 
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military oper-
ations having a technical knowledge. 
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups. 
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel. 
(4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge. 
4. Direction 
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence 
collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies). 
b. Amplification of Items Wanted Lists. 
c. Special technical intelligence targets. 
d. Policies governing publishing requirements. 
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate 
support elements (Le. FASCOM, General and Direct Support 
Elements). 
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom 
rendered. 
g. Preparing EEl and other intelligence requirements. 
h. Host-country agreement (if applicable). 
5. Collections 
a. Documents 
(1) Procedures for collecting technical documents. 
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents (see 
appendix IV, STANAG 2084, FM 30-16). 
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents. 
CLASSIFICATION 
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(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemina-
tion of technical data. 
(5) Handling of timely technical data. 
(6) Channels for forwarding. 
b. Prisoners 
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowl-
edge. 
(2) Responsibilities of IPW personnel. 
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with IPW and combat 
intelligence personnel. 
(4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge. 
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge. 
(6) Channels for evacuation. 
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees). 
(8) Reports to be rendered. 
c. Materiel 
(1) Specific unit responsibilities. 
(2) Examination policies. 
(3) Evacuation channels. 
(a) Primary. 
(b) Alternate. 
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a 
target should be destroyed). 
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment. 
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment. 
(7) Safeguarding. 
(8) Marking. 
(9) Ultimate disposition. 
d. Facilities and Installations. 
(1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting infor-
mation. 
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelli-
gence interest. 
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data. 
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data. 
6. Processing 
a. Records and/or files required to be maintained. 
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports. 
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS). 
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS). 
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical 
intelligence company and other intelligence elements concern-
ing evaluation and interpretation of technical information. 
7. Dissemination 
a. Scope. 
b. Content. 
c. Editorial assistance. 
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d. Types of reports. 
e. Special reports. 
f. Policies governing dissemination. 
8. Functional and Task Force Operations. 
a. Theater and/or theater army policies. 
b. Scope and priorities. 
c. Effort that may be expended on missions. 
d. Additional support sources if needed. 
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data. 
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations. 
g. Limitations on units and individuals. 
h. Security. 
i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value. 
j. Host-country agreement. 
Distribution: C 
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APPENDIX IV 
STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF 
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 
(Editorial note: STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED 
ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT, dated 22 June 1962, also adopted as 
SOLOG 94, is a primary concern in this field manual. Normally, the Details of Agree-
ment (DofA) which appear in this STANAG would have been reproduced in this 
appendix, and remain valid until such time as the STANAG is officially withdrawn or 
revised. However, this procedure has not been followed in this instance because the 
U. S. Armed Forces (and other NATO members) have developed and concurred in a 
revision of STANAG 2084 which has been recommended to the Army Board, Military 
Agency for Standardization, NATO, for promulgation as STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 
2)-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND 
DOCUMENTS. It is anticipated that the revised STANAG will be promulgated ap-
proximately in April 1966; therefore, the DofA of the revised STANAG (subject to 
minor editorial changes which may appear in the published text of Edition No.2) have 
been selected for the appendix of this field manual in lieu of the DofA which they will 
soon replace. It is also to be noted that the descriptive title of STANAG 2084 (Edition 
No.2) has been changed to agree with the sequence followed in the DofA). 
STANAG 2084 (Edition No.2) HANDLING AND REPORTING OF 
CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS 
(Adopted as SOLOG 94) 
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA) 
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY 
EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS 
Enclosures: Annex A (DofA)-Types of Captured Enemy Equipment 
Annex B (DofA)-PRETECHREP 
Annex C (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE A 
Annex D (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE B 
Annex E (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE C 
Annex F (DofA)-Technical Intelligence Teams 
AGREEMENT 
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will use the procedure 
detailed in Part I for the handling of captured enemy equipment and asso-
ciated technical documents and in Part II for handling captured enemy 
documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the 
description and procedure for these reports in Annexes A-F (DofA). 
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any national right on the equip-
ment proper. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. Document 
Any recorded information regardless of its physical form of char-
acteristics includes, but is not limited to, the following: All written mate-
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rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or 
engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs 
and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions 
of the foregoing, by whatever process produced. 
PART I 
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND 
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
GENERAL 
2. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) and associated technical docu-
ments will be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the 
following processing channels: 
a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of imme-
diate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO. 
b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special 
intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams). 
c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear areas. 
Note. A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A 
(DofA). 
3. The technical intelligence report;s and documents considered are: 
a. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted 
by the capturing Unit). Annex B (DofA). 
b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (sub-
mitted by Technical Intelligence Teams). Annex B (DofA). 
c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by spe-
cialists as appropriate). 
d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Mainte-
nance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.). 
4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should 
be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for 
the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists 
for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be 
set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to: 
a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Tech-
nical Reports. 
b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical 
Reports. 
c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base 
or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a 
minimum of one per Army Group). 
d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units. 
e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined 
as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full 
use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. 
(See STANAG 2033 (Edition No.2).) 
Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to 
Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW, 
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rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or 
engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs 
and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions 
of the foregoing, by whatever process produced. 
PART I 
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND 
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
GENERAL 
2. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) and associated technical docu-
ments will be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the 
following processing channels: 
a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of imme-
diate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO. 
b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special 
intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams). 
c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear areas. 
Note. A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A 
(DofA). 
3. The technical intelligence report;s and documents considered are: 
a. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted 
by the capturing Unit). Annex B (DofA). 
b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (sub-
mitted by Technical Intelligence Teams). Annex B (DofA). 
c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by spe-
cialists as appropriate). 
d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Mainte-
nance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.). 
4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should 
be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for 
the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists 
for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be 
set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to: 
a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Tech-
nical Reports. 
b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical 
Reports. 
c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base 
or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a 
minimum of one per Army Group). 
d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units. 
e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined 
as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full 
use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. 
(See STANAG 2033 (Edition No.2).) 
Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to 
Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW, 
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must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (See STANAG 2044 
(Edition No.2).) 
f. Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical docu-
ments which may assist them in their examination. 
5. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be inde-
pendent, or organic to the units earmarked or assigned to NATO and be 
sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equipments. They 
will need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for 
compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation 
for these teams is given at Annex F (DofA). 
6. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed exam-
ination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial 
data which can be obtained in the field. Such teams should be in a position 
after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Report. No sug-
gested allocation is given for these teams as they will depend on national 
resources available. 
HANDLING OF CEE BY CAPTURING UNIT 
7. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value will submit 
the Preliminary Technical Report given at Annex B (DofA). This report 
will be transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting procedures 
when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate 
effect upon the current situation. Reports not containing such information 
will be transmitted by the quickest possible means with the precedence 
as determined by the commander initiating the report. These reports will 
contain a general description of the equipment and any technical infor-
mation of immediate tactical importance. 
8. Unit Commanders will be responsible for placing the captured 
enemy equipment under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or 
destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Field Teams. 
9. All technical documents will be clearly tagged or otherwise iden-
tified so as to avoid defacing and marked "TECHDOC" by the capturing 
unit or appropriate agency. In the normal exploitation of capt!lred ctO(;U 
ments the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guid-
ance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examina-
tions. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical 
exploitation is finalized. 
10. The command concerned will notify the appropriate Technical 
Intelligence Team, which will arrange to examine the CEE, either on the 
spot or nearby where better field facilities may exist. (See Annex 
F(DofA).) 
11. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of 
the Complementary Report will be completed and sent through normal 
staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional infor-
mation of tactical value as can be extracted will be sent directly to such 
headquarters as specified by NATO Authorities. The formats of these 
reports are given in Annexes C, D and E (DofA). 
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HANDLING OF CEE FOR SPECIALISTS 
12. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation 
of the equipment to the rear areas where suitable facilities exist for a 
detailed examination of the equipment by specialists. 
13. This will enable the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. 
No illustration is given of this type of report in view of the great variety 
of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already 
used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports will be sub-
mitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as 
those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national intel-
ligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary 
or the Detailed Technical Reports have been forwarded. 
14. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to 
conduct an exhaustive field or rear area exploitation of the equipment, the 
appropriate NATO authority will advise the capturing nation as to further 
action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing 
nation of the results of that exploitation. 
PART II 
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED 
ENEMY DOCUMENTS 
GENERAL 
15. Captured enemy documents (CED), except those belonging to 
CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, will be forwarded for exploi-
tation to the appropriate "Captured Document Center." These centers will 
be, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents 
will be sent with the minimum delay through the following processing 
channels: 
a. National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for 
information of immediate tactical value. 
b. Special Intelligence Support Teams for CED for secondary 
screening, reproductions and dissemination to all concerned. 
c. USACDC for detailed exploitation and indexing. 
16. Captured documents will be divided as follows: 
a. Category "A." Category "A" documents are those which con-
tain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as 
enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons and equipment 
by the enemy, his logistic situation, (Stock levels, shortage, supply sys-
tems, especially supply systems for missiles) his morale, his losses, etc. 
Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the orig-
inals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence 
staffs at the earliest possible moment. 
b. Category "E." Category "B" documents are cryptographic docu-
ments, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio sys-
tems. These documents must reach the appropriate intelligence staffs at the 
earliest possible moment. 
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c. Category "C." Category "c" documents are those of lesser intel-
ligence value. 
d. Category "D." Category "D" documents are those which contain 
no information of intelligence value. 
HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BY 
THE CAPTURING UNIT 
17. Captured documents will be forwarded without delay by the cap-
turing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details of 
the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), together with 
the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the 
documents were found. 
18. Documents will be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as 
to avoid defacing, by the capturing unit in the following way: 
a. Identification Letters. Documents will be tagged showing the 
nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters pre-
scribed in STANAG 1059. 
b. Designation of Capturing Units. This will include the service 
to which the unit belongs. 
c. Serial Number. Units will give each document a serial number 
and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary. 
d. Date/Time of capture. 
e. Place of capture (with map coordinates). 
f. Summary of circumstances under which the document was found. 
19. In cases, where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO 
staffs and units, and not by national forces assigned to or earmarked for 
NATO, then the identification letters to be used will be "NA." Other in-
structions in paragraph 18, however, will apply. 
20. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is in-
cluded in a unit or information intelligence report, the identification let-
ters and number of the document concerned will be quoted to avoid sub-
sequent false confirmation. 
HANDLING OF CED BY INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND 
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS 
21. All captured documents will be categorized and forwarded. The 
detailed procedures for handling captured documents will include the fol-
lowing main tasks: 
a. Screening. 
b. Recording 
c. Translation. 
d. Reproduction. 
e. Dissemination. 
22. Intelligence staffs will insure that there is no delay in the exploi-
tation of captured documents. If for any reason, qualified personnel or 
microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficient 
to handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents 
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will be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and will not 
be retained by the staff in question. 
23. The staff concerned will handle the documents in one of the 
following ways: 
a. Category "A." 
(1) Where microfilming facilities exist, they will photograph 
documents with attached comments, and forward original documents di-
rect to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO Intelligence 
Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. 
Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms will be examined for 
information of tactical value to local commanders. 
(2) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable lin-
guists are available, they will examine documents for information of tac-
tical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and for-
ward without delay to the appropriate higher headquarters. 
(3) Where linguists are not available within the formation head-
quarters, the documents should go to the PW interrogators for evaluation. 
b. Category "B." These will be forwarded without delay to the 
Naval, Army, or Air Force headquarters which are primarily interested. 
The NATO international headquarters under which the capturing unit 
operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important 
documents in this category as soon as possible. 
c. Category "C." The staff concerned will forward Category "C" 
documents direct to the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for 
exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include: 
(1) Unmarked maps and charts of previously unknown types 
which will be forwarded to the nearest engineer unit or topographical 
section. 
(2) Personal mail and pay books taken from a PW, which will 
be returned to the PW after exploitation by interrogation personnel or 
intelligence staffs. 
(3) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they 
have served their purpose in interrogation, will be forwarded to the ap-
propriate intelligence staff for further exploitation. 
(4) Documents specifically related to equipment which will, if 
of intelligence value, accompany the equipment to the intelligence agency 
responsible for exploitation and then will be sent without delay to the 
captured document center. 
d. Category "D." Captured documents will not become final as 
Category "D" until they have been thoroughly analyzed by document 
translation specialists at the highest command echelon interested, pref-
erably at least two levels above division. Category "D" documents will be 
disposed of as directed by appropriate authority. 
24. Documents of the Categories "A," "B," "C," and "D" captured 
from crashed enemy aircraft or, in particular, related to enemy anti-
aircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, will be trans-
mitted to the nearest Air Force headquarters without delay. The same 
procedure applies to all captured maps and charts of enemy air forces. 
After evaluation by the responsible Air Force intelligence staff they will 
be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents 
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taken from a ship, including Category "B" code books, call signs, fre-
quency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be forwarded without 
delay to the nearest naval force headquarters. 
25. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals 
and drawings should accompany the captured equipment until the intel-
ligence exploitation is completed. 
HANDLING OF CED BY THE 
CAPTURED DOCUMENT CENTER (CDC) 
26. Lists of documents which have been exploited will be distributed 
to all intelligence staffs by the CDC to avoid duplication in translating 
and processing identical documents by different units. A master list of 
all captured documents which have be~n exploited in NATO commands 
will be maintained. 
27. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, 
the original documents will be sent to the national staff whose forces 
captured them. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
28. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when 
the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this 
Agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned. 
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Annex A (DofA) STANAG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT 
Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical 
Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of devel-
opment ("significant equipment") will be the main concern of these 
teams.) 
1. Army Equipment. 
a. Guided missiles. 
COMTECHREP 
b. Ammunition, all types including mines, demolitions, 
pyrotechnics and chemical. 
c. Infantry weapons. 
d. Sabotage equipment. 
e. Armored fighting vehicles (AFV's) Type B 
f. Military vehicles excluding AFV's. > See Annex 
g. Artillery, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field D (DofA) 
rocket weapons. 
h. Guided missile launching systems. 
i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing 
j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication 
equipment. 
k. Airborne equipment. 
I. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and 
chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary 
weapons, equipment for dispersion of chemical and 
biological warfare agents, together with protective 
devices. 
m. Miscellaneous equipments: 
(1) Camouflage equipment. 
(2) Clothing and personal equipment. 
(3) Medical equipment. 
(4) Rations. 
2. Air Force Equipment. 
a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant. 
b. Airborne, armament and ammunition, bomb sights, 
gun sights and photographic equipment. 
c. Airborne radio and electrical equipment. 
d. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instru-
ments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other 
safety equipment. 
e. Ground equipment and installations. 
f. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants. 
g. Guided missiles and associated equipment. 
h. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biolog-
ical warfare agents. 
i. Miscellaneous equipments: 
(1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits, 
pressure breathing equipment, etc. 
(2) Medical equipments and flying rations. 
J 
)[Type C 
See Annex I E(DofA) 
) 
J 
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3. Navy Equipment. 
a. Ships. 
b. Missiles and launching systems. 
c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., 
radars, range finders, stable elements, range keepers, spotters' telescopes, 
gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuzes, fuze setters, 
recoil mechanisms, weapons of all types including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, 
Weapon "A" equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks and "Y" and 
"K" gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes; including ASW launch-
ers; rockets and rocket launchers. 
d. Sea mines of all types, including moored, bottom and floating; 
contact and influence. 
e. Harbour defense equipment including nets, booms, alerting de-
vices, net tenders. 
f. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equip-
ment, sonars, fathometers and sonobuoys. 
g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants. 
h. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame 
and incendiary equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological war-
fare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing, gas masks 
and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for protection. 
i. Medical supplies and medical instruments. 
j. Demolition and sabotage equipment, underwater demolition team 
(UDT) equipment (sleds, masks, etc.). 
k. Naval engineering systems, including: main propulsion machin-
ery, steam or gas turbines, boilers, diesel engines, auxiliary equipment in-
cluding motor generators, heat exchangers, pumps, evaporators, fuel oil 
systems for boilers and diesel engines, including fuel pumps and fuel oil 
heaters; pressure gauges, boiler accessories including safety valves, steam 
control valves, gauge glasses, feed water check valves, propellers, hull 
zincs, refrigerating machinery, submarine storage batteries and their ven-
tilating equipment, ammeters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering en-
gines, engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas ana-
lyzers, CO2 scrubbers, compressors, and ships underwater logs; samples 
of metals used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of weld-
ing technique used in shipbuilding. 
1. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equip-
ment, life rafts and signal apparatus or any of their components such as 
as hydrofoil foils. 
m. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fueling and transfer at 
sea rigs, and cargo handling gear. 
n. Hydrographic survey ships equipment including high altitude 
research rockets and their launching equipment, sonars and fathometers, 
sea bottoms ampling gear such as drags and coring equipment, deep sea 
anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment, 
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N ansen bottles, possible helicopters and other equipment such as labora-
tory instruments. 
Notes. 
(1) Although cryptographic material is not specifically mentioned in the above 
lists, technical intelligence teams will also be responsible for the collection of such 
material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment will be issued by the 
appropriate NATO command. 
(2) Where no requirement exists for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence 
Teams, such groups may be set upon an ad hoc basis. 
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Annex B (DofA) to STANAG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
PRETECHREP 
To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures im-
mediately following the acquisition of significant enemy equipment (see 
paragraph 7 (DofA).) 
A. Date found, location (map reference). 
B. Type of equipment and quantity. 
C. Origin. 
D. Brief description with distinguishing marks. 
E. Technical characteristics with an immediate value. 
F. Signature of the commander of capturing unit. 
G. Time and origin of the message. 
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Annex C(DofA) to STANAG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
COMTECHREP-TYPE A 
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following 
initial examination of enemy aircraft. 
A. Date and location of crash and map of reference. 
B. Type of aircraft and: 
(1) Overall length. 
(2) Overall wing-span. 
C. Identification and distinguishing marks. 
D. Type of engine(s) and condition. 
E. Cause of Crash; number, location and caliber of projectile 
strikes; condition of aircraft. 
F. Armament: 
(1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity. 
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines. 
(3) Bombs and bomb installations. 
(4) Mines and mine carriers. 
(5) Rocket projectiles and carriers. 
(6) Pyrotechnics, number and type. 
G. Armour plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, 
penetrations. 
H. Number of crew and fate. 
1. Wings and control surfaces, leading edge, of protected against 
balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; 
de-icing. 
J. State if samples are obtainable of: 
(1) Gasoline. 
(2) Oil. 
(3) Coolant. 
(4) Hydraulic fluids. 
(5) De-icing fluids. 
K. Internal equipment; state condition arid whether bombsights, 
radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and 
instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, altera-
tions or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible. 
L. Landing gear; type and condition. 
M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not 
mentioned. 
N. Name plates photographed: 
( 1 ) Airframe. 
(2) Engine. 
(3) Others. 
O. Other information. 
P. Name of officer in Command of Technical Intelligence Team 
making examination. 
Q. Time and origin of message. 
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Annex D (DofA) to STAN AG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
COMTECHREP-TYPE B 
1. COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about 
ammunition, missiles, bombs, shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, 
etc. 
2. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately fol-
lowing initial examination. 
3. Only use those letters for which information is available. 
A. Nationality, designation and mark number. 
B. Description. 
C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes and fittings. 
D. Maximum diameter of missiles. 
E. Shape and design of Inissiles (streamlining shells), 
F. Length and width of tail. 
G. Span of vanes. 
H. Thickness of casing at nose. 
1. Thickness of casing at sides. 
J. Thickness of casing at base. 
K. Material of body. 
L. Material of tail or vanes. 
M. Colour and marking of nose. 
N. Colour and marking of body. 
O. Colour and marking of tailor vanes. 
P. Weight and nature of main filling. 
Q. Total weight of missile. 
R. Method of suspension. 
S. Detonation system. 
T. Fusing systems and markings. 
U. Anti-handling or booby trap devices. 
V. Method of propulsion. 
W. Date and location of lTIissile. 
X. Other information. 
Y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team 
making examination. 
X. Time and origin of message. 
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Annex E(DofA) to STANAG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
COMTECHREP-TYPE C 
To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item 
of captured equipment not covered under Types A and B. 
A. Date found, location (map reference). 
B. Type of equipment and quantity. 
C. Origin. 
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details). 
E. Conditions of equipment. 
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (addi-
tional details). 
G. Recommended disposal. 
H. Name plates photographed. 
I. Photographs taken. 
J. Other information. 
K. Name of chief of team. 
L. Time and origin of message. 
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Annex F(DofA) to STANAG 
2084 (Edition No.2) 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS 
1. Army and air teams should be provided by national forces assigned 
to NATO on the following minimum bases: 
a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a 
peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece): two army and two air 
teams. 
b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on a penin-
sula (Turkey): two army and two air teams per front. 
2. See paragraph 4 (DofA), regarding naval teams. 
3. It is recognized that as these teams will be furnished on a national 
basis, their composition will be partly determined by national character-
istics. However, the following composition of army and air teams is sug-
gested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence sup-
port to the fighting forces: 
a. Air Team. 
(1) Airframe-engine equipment. 
(2) Armament. 
(3) Radio-electronics. 
(4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment. 
(5) Guided missile ordnance. 
b. Army Team. 
(1) Vehicles, tanks. 
(2) Engineering equipment. 
(3) Armament. 
( 4) Radio-electronics. 
(5) Guided-missile ordnance. 
(6) Administrative. 
(7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist. 
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APPENDIX V 
STANAG 2097-NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC ARMY 
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA) 
NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT 
Enclosure: Annex "A" (DofA)-Titles of Groups of Weapons and 
Equipment. 
GENERAL 
1. The NATO Armed Forces agree to use the nomenclature of the 
country of origin for Soviet Bloc Army weapons, equipment and vehicles 
whenever this nomenclature is known. 
2. When the nomenclature of the country of origin is NOT known a 
short descriptive title will be devised and used as an interim measure only. 
3. These short interim title will be issued by SHAPE as soon as pos-
sible after the sighting details have been received from national/NATO 
sources. When reporting new items to SHAPE national/NATO sources 
should suggest a possible interim title, formulated as detailed in the subse-
quent paragraphs. Interim titles should: 
a. Include the country of design and manufacture (where this is 
different from the country of design) or the best intelligence 
estimate thereof. 
b. Include a question mark after the country name when appropri-
ate. 
c. Become progressively more specific, e.g. 
(1) E. German (?) Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A.KG-3. 
When the manner in which information was obtained clearly warrants 
protection of a confidential source or method, the NATO country provid-
ing the information will assign a security classification which will remain 
binding on all recipients until the classification is removed by the origi-
nating authority. 
DESCRIPTION 
5. The nomenclature for any given piece of equipment will include 
an adequate description to show: 
a. the role of the equipment, e.g., medium tank, howitzer, antitank 
gun; 
b. type of chassis where applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless 
otherwise stated), e.g., half tracked, tracked. 
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WEAPON CALIBERS 
6. The caliber of all weapons will be referred to in millimeters and 
will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon. 
7. The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will always be used. 
DATE OF FIRST SIGHTING OR EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE 
8. The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist will 
be indicated by the use of the letter M and the four figures of the year. 
These figures will become part of the title, e.g., 100 mm Field Gun M 1964. 
9. It is possible that more than one new equipment of a similar type 
may be sighted in anyone year. To distinguish between the various types 
a numerical suffix will be applied to the sighting date, e.g., M 1962/1, 
M 1962/2, M 1962/3. 
EXAMPLES OF TITLES 
10. The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons 
and equipment, and examples of these titles, are shown at Annex "A" 
(DofA). 
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Annex "A" (DofA) to 
STANAG 2097 
TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 
Type of Equipment 
Small Arms 
Infantry anti-aircraft (AA) Weapons 
Infantry anti-tank (AT) Weapons 
Hand Grenades 
Artillery 
Rocket Launchers 
Tanks 
Armored Personnel Carriers 
Assault Guns (SU's) 
Soft Skinned Vehicles including 
wheeled amphibians 
Engineer Equipment 
Radars 
Missiles 
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Items in Title 
Caliber 
Description 
Sighting year 
If anti-tank (AT) 
Sighting year 
Caliber 
Description 
If Self-propelled (SP) 
Sighting year 
Caliber 
Description 
Number of rounds 
Sighting year 
Weight class 
If amphibious 
Sighting year 
If amphibious 
If tracked or half-tracked. 
Sighting year 
Description 
Caliber (without mm) 
Sighting year 
If amphibious 
If tracked 
Description 
Type of drive (wheels) 
Sighting year 
Description 
Sighting year 
Description and Type 
Sighting year 
Role 
Sighting year 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN-
Examples 
7.62mm Pistol M 1964 
12.7mm AA Machinegun M 7963 
82mm AT Launcher M 1964 
Hand Grenades M 1964 
A T Hand Grenades M 1964 
100mm Field Gun M 1964 
152mm SP Gun M 1965 
240mm Rocket Launcher (16-round) 
M 1964 
One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964 
Medium Tank M 1964 
Light Amphibious Tank M 1964 
APC M 1964 
Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964 
SU-I00 M 1964 
Truck, 4x2 M 1964 
Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965 
Tracked Amphibian M 1964 
Trencher M 1964 
Pontoon M 1964 
Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964 
Surveillance Field Radar M 1964 
Fire Control Anti-Aircraft Radar M 1964 
SSM 1964 
SAM 1964 
(Use STANAG 3236 when applicable) 
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CHANGE)' 
No.1 
FM 30-16 
C 1 
HE'ADQU.A .. RTERS 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARl\fY 
'VASHINGTOX, D.C., 15 Jrune 1967 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
FJ\I30-16, 19 Septelnber 1966, is changed as follows: 
Page 3, paragraph 1a. Line 6 is changed to read 
"nonnuclear warfare and in chemical, bioloO'ical 
d· 1 . I!l , I'a 10 oglca], and internal defense environments. 
It covers procedures and." 
Page 8, paragraph 2b (2). In line 19 "internal 
clefense~' is changed to read "stability." 
Page 4. Paragraph 5d is superseded as follows: 
d. Provide information ,yhich enables U.S. 
forces to use foreign material and facilities. 
Page 4~ paragraph 5n. Line 1 is changed to read 
"Provide the technical intelligence aspects for 
tactical and strategic studies on." 
Page 6, paragraph 9a. In line 4, "intelliO'ence 
within" is changed to read "intelligence m~sion 
within." The last sentence is deleted. 
Page 6, paragraph 9b. In line 5, "with" is 
changed to read "bet,Yeen." 
Page 6. Paragraph 90 is rescinded. 
Pagers 6 and 9, paragraph 10. Subparagraphs a~ 
b, and 0 are redesignated as b, 0, and d and sub-
paragraph a is added as follows: 
a. The technical intelligence company is capable 
of providing necessary technical intelligence sup-
port to corps and divisions assigned to the field 
army. In addition, it is a flexible oro'anization 
readily adaptable to the integration of technical 
intelligence activities of other services and can be 
integrated into a joint or unified command intel-
ligence effort in all type-s of ,Yarfare. The techni-
cal intelligence company is completely airtrans-
portable; however, it is only 50 percent ground 
mobile using organic vehicles. 
Page 9~ paragraph 12b (3). Line 8 is changed to 
read "biological, and radiological defense ma-
teriel." 
Page 10, paragraph 120(3) (I). In lines 8 and 
9, "miscellaneous" is changed to read "general." 
. Page 1B, paragraph 14a. In line 2, "equipment" 
IS changed to read "intelligence." 
Page 13. Paragraph 14g (12) is added as fol-
lows; 
1'.:\GO lA--July 300-465 C43-67 
(12) Communications equipment modules. 
Page 16. Paragraph 22a. is superseded as fol-
lmys; 
a. The scope of mobility intelligence is compre-
hensiye. It covers most aspects of engineer and 
transportation actiyity at all echelons of the 
enemy's military organization. Engineer and 
transportcltion support has become increasingly 
important in all types of military operations due 
to the increasing nse of engineer and transporta-
tion equipment by supply anel transport agencies 
of all armies. 
Page 16, paTagraph 22b. In line 3, after "tacti-
cal technical intelligence." the following is added 
"See FJ\i 30-5 for a discussion of the interrelation-
ship of tactical and strategic intelligence." 
Page 16, paragraph 220. In lines 9 and 10, the 
words "structures, facilities, and manmade objects 
such as," are deleted. 
Page 17. Paragraph 24a is superseded as f01-
lmys: 
(t. :.afedical intelligence is that cateO'ol'V of intel-
• b J 
hgence ,yhich concerns itself with man as a living 
organism and those factors which affect his effi-
ciency, capability, and well-being. Although medi-
cal intelligence is a functional entity and should 
not be fragmented, strategic requirements indicate 
the need for intelligence concerning foreign Inedi-
cal technical deyelopments, performance, and op-
erational capabilities. 
Page 17. Paragraph 24a..1 is added as follows: 
a.1. l\Iedical technical intelligence is not primar~ 
ily materiel-oriented. Examination, evaluation, 
and classification of medical materiel are only seg-
lllents of the total medical technical intelligence 
effort. If possible, medical intelligence must re-
tain integrity so that the end product will include 
all available information a-ffeeting the health and 
weHare of men and animals in actual or possible 
areas of military operation which is immediately 
or potentially significant. Snch information IS 
1 
vital in both strategic and tactical planning and 
may influence military operations. 
Page 17, paragraph 25c. In line 2, "deflectors'~ 
is changed to read "defectors.~' 
Pa.ge 18. Paragraph 27 g is rescinded. 
Page 19~ paragraph 29a. In lines 15 ancl16, the 
sentence "The initiation of CBR operations can 
change the entire course of a wnr.:~ is deleted. 
Page 19, paragraph 30. Subparagraphs c and c 
a,re snperseded and Ii is added as follows: 
c. Preparing and forwarding samples of bio-
logical agents to medical laboratory personnel for 
identification. 
e. ~rnintaining liaison ,,,ith the general chemi-
cal laboratory. 
Ii. 4\nalyzing and identifying enemy-delivered. 
chemical agents within the limitations of the eBR 
agent sampling and analyzing kit. 
Page it). Paragraph in is superseded as follows: 
31. Additional Capability 
Chemical persollnel have the additional capabil-
ity of collecting CBR samples following enemy 
attack for cleli,'ery to the supporting general 
chemical laboratory (for an~lysis. and identifica-
tion of chemical and radiological agents), and to 
the supporting medical service laboratory (fol' 
identification of biological agents). 
Page 91. Paragraph 37b (9) is added as follows: 
(9) Engineer topographic units and terrain 
teams. 
Page :32, paragraph 38b. In lines 1 through 3, 
first. sentence is superseded as follows: 
b. Frequently, many priority technical intelli-
gence collection requirements will be generated by 
intelligence collection progrmns established at na-
tional and Department of Defense levels. These 
programs include priorit.y requirements for cer-
tain items of enemy equipment and materiel. Such 
requirements normally will be distributed to U.S. 
Army collection agencies in the form of Items 
,YantedLists (I'VL). 
Page g2~ paragraph i39a. In line 16, after "ob-
tained/' the following is added "This is especially 
important concerning documents relating to 
enemy C0l1111lUllications-electronics systems, for 
example: code books, call signs, frequency tables, 
signal operating instructions (SOl), standing sig-
na.] instructions (SSI), cryptography and en-
crypted items.~' 
2 
Page 22. Paragraph 39c is superseded as 
follows: 
c. Oorps Technical Intelligence Oollcction 
TeanM. These teams are trained to collect and 
search for tactic-al information on foreign ma-
teriel, facilities, methods, techniques, and techni-
cal activities. Technical intelligence augmentation 
teams (TOE 30-600), assigned to the technical in-
telligence company, will be placed in direct sup-
port of the various corps elements, and will con-
tact frontline tactical elements for collection of 
Inateriel. Technical ~ntelligence teams assist pri-
marily in carrying out the technical intelligence 
collection tesponsibilities of the corps. 
Page 2.4. Paragraph 43 is superseded as follows: 
43. Collecting Points 
Collecting points are facilities to which cap-
tured or abandoned foreign materiel is evacuated 
for temporary storage anel proper disposition in 
accordance with technical intelligence require-
ments. Collecting points operate, where needed, 
throughout the theater of operations for the classi-
fication, segregation, disassembly, and disposition 
of serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel 
in accordance ,yith guidance and instructions pro-
vided by the field army commander. In the divi-
sion areas, 11laintenance. or salvage collecting 
points operated by division support command 
units, normally are designated to receive captured 
or abandoned foreign materiel (F~f 29-22). In 
the field army area and CO~fM:Z, the collecting 
points are normally those operated by the Collec-
tion and Classification Compauy (TOE 29-139). 
Evacuation flow through collecting points is as 
sho'wn in figure 3. 
Page 26. ParagralJh 44e is rescinded. 
Page 30, paragraph 49a. In the first sentence 
"expertise" is changed to read "proficiency." 
Page 3:3, paragraph 55([,. In line 6 "expertise'~ is 
changed to read "proficiency." 
Page 34. Paragraph 60 is superseded as follows: 
60. Combined Operation Reports 
Appendix V outlines current N ATO-standard-
ized nomenclature as prescribed by STANAG 
2097. ,Vhell possible, all teehnical intelligence re-
port. nomenclature should be NATO-standardized 
and should be in consonance with overall unified/ 
joint/theater policies and guidance. 
TAGO lA 
Page 37, paragraph 67b. In line 9, Hpersonnel" 
is changed to read ", chemical laboratory, or medi-
cal laboratory personnel" 
Page 40. Paragraph 78c(1) is superseded as 
follows: 
(1) Ci viliau technicians-engineers, archi-
teets, chemists, physicists, and communi-
cations-electronics specialists. 
Page 41. Chapter 8, the title is changed to read 
"STABILITY OPERATIONS." 
Page 41, paragraph 79a. In lines 2 and 3 "inter-
nal defense development assistance operations" is 
changed to read "stability operations." 
Page 41, paragraph 79b. In line 11 "internal 
defense~' is changed to read "stability." 
Page 41, paragraph 79d. In line 9 "will" is 
changed to read "with." 
Page 493, paragraph 81. In line 1 "internal de-
fense" is changed to read "stability." 
Page 4:2, paragraph 84a. In lines 2 and 3 "in-
ternal defense" is changed to read "stability." 
Page '.1;;3, paragraph 84b. In line 5 "propellants, 
and petroleum products." is changed ~o read "pro-
pellents, communications-electronics equipment, 
and petroleum products." 
Page 44, paragraph 88. The title is changed to 
read "Strike Operations." 
'l'AGO lA 
Paragraph 88a. The first sentence is changed 
to read "An important characteristic of stability 
operations is the extensive use of strike operations. 
These operations are offensive in nature and in-
clude reconnaissance in force, raids, coordinated 
attacks, and search and destroy and search and 
clear operatiops. Strike operations are tenninated 
by 'withdrawal fronl the operational area upon mis-
sion accOlnplishnlent; the holding of terrain is not 
emphasized." . 
Page 44. Paragraph 88b(9) (e) is superseded 
as follo"\ys: 
(e) Assessment of Inedical standards. 
Page 45.. Paragraph 90. In line 1 "internal de-
fense~~ is changed to read "stahility." 
Page 417. Paragra ph 93c (.3.1) is added as 
follows: 
(3.1) l\fedical Intelligence Officer. 
Page 4'7, paragraph 94. After line 7, the follow-
ing sentence is added: 
The functions of the Army l\Iedical Intelligence 
Officer are to direct the A:NIEDS intelligence pro-
gram, and to deyelop and administer those nled-
ical intelligence activities, to include collecting 
and producing Inedical scientific and technical in-
telligence, for which the Surgeon General is 
responsible. 
Page 48. Figure 6 is superseded as follo"\vs: 
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TAGO lA 
Page 50, appendix I. The following are added to 
the list of references in proper numerical order: 
:fM 19-2, !Iilitary Support in the Field 
Army. 
FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability 
Operations. 
The following changes are nlade to indicate 
classification: 
(S) F!1 3-10A, Employment of Biological 
Agents (U). 
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 
OfJicial: 
KENNETH G. 1VICKHAM:, 
Major Genel'al, United States A11my, 
The Adjutant General. 
T,\GO lA 
(C) F!1 3-10B, Employment of Chemical 
Agents (U). 
FM 11-30 is deleted. 
Page 52, a,ppendix II. After category (5) (0) 
the following are added: 
(p) Construction equipment. 
(q) Mine warfare equipment. 
(1') Bridging. 
(s) Psychological warfare equipment. 
HAROLD I{' JOHNSON, 
General, United States Army, 
Ohief of Staff· 
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